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Faculty and Deans

REVIEW ESSAYS
Judicial Matters
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?

By Gerald N. Rosenberg.t Chicago, Illinois: The University of
Chicago Press, 1991. Pp. vii, 425. Cloth.
Reviewed by Neal Devins!

Imagine the rights of criminal defendants without Mapp v. Ohio 1 or
Miranda v. Arizona ;2 the rights of women without Roe v. Wade ;3 or the
rights of racial minorities without Brown v. Board of Education. 4 For
those who see the courts "as powerful, vigorous, and potent proponents
of change" (p. 2), that world would be horrific-"a land in which women
would be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated
lunch counters, [and] rogue police could break down citizens' doors in
midnight raids." 5 Indeed, the political furor over Clarence Thomas,
Robert Bork, and other Supreme Court nominees is largely informed by
the belief that Supreme Court Justices wield enormous political power.
This belief also explains, as Justice Scalia complained, why the Justices
are subject to "carts full of mail from the public, and streets full of demonstrators, urging us-their unelected and life-tenured judges . . .-to
follow the popular will." 6
This portrayal of the Court as a player, shaping policy through decisions with a nationwide impact, is hardly surprising. To suggest other-
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who commented on an earlier draft of this essay through workshops coordinated by the law school's
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and Jeremy Rabkin for their comments on an earlier draft. All errors are my own.
1. 367 u.s. 643 (1961).
2. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
3. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
4. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
5. That is how Senator Edward Kennedy described "Robert Bork's America" in a speech he
delivered from the Senate floor. 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
6. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). On the question of whether judges should be removed from overt political
demonstrations, see Robert F. Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in Constitutional Cases, 61 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 685 (1990).
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wise, that court decisions are of little consequence in altering
bureaucratic and institutional practices, seems preposterous. This
counterintuitive thesis, however, lies at the heart of Gerald Rosenberg's
The Hollow Hope. Pointing to "severe limitations" in the "design[ ]" of
American courts, Rosenberg concludes that courts "rarely ... can make
a difference" (pp. 342-43). Meaningful reform, instead, is accomplished
through social movements and elected branch initiatives.
The Hollow Hope, by suggesting that courts "rarely" matter, breaks
new ground in the debate over the judicial role. Others have fought over
the consistency of court-ordered social reform with the separation of
powers, the propensity of courts to advance individual rights, the vulnerability of courts to elected branch reprisals, the capacity of courts to
effectively administer institutional reform, the impact of such court
orders, and the propriety of elected government efforts to shape constitutional norms. 7 While this debate is far-reaching and sharp lines have
been drawn on every issue, it presupposes that courts (for better or
worse) make a difference. By challenging this assumption, The Hollow
Hope seeks to fundamentally change the way social reformers, academics, and politicians view the courts.
Rosenberg accomplishes this task by measuring both the direct and
indirect effects of court action. 8 Direct effects concern changes in institu7. For even-handed overview discussions of the judicial activism debate, see CHARLES A.
JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984);
MICHAEL A. REDELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS 315 (1982); Robert A. Katzmann, Note, Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing
Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513, 513-18 (1980). For arguments that farreaching judicial policymaking is an inevitable outgrowth of congressional incentives and judicial
attributes, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976) (arguing for a broader judicial role when dictated by the needs of justice); Theodore
Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93
HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980) (arguing that modem broader judicial roles are consistent with
traditional judicial attributes); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial
Supervision of Public Institutions. 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1269-88 (tracing the roots of the modem
judicial role). For criticisms of judicial policymaking, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE CoURTS
AND SOCIAL PoLICY (1977) (arguing that courts lack the institutional attributes ofpolicymakers); R.
SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS (1983) (arguing that courts cannot manage
unintended consequences of their decisions); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS (1989)
(arguing that courts improperly transform government agencies into agencies of constituent
interests); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in
Public Institutions. 65 VA. L. REv. 43, 88-106 (1979) (same); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers
and the &ope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 718-23 (1978) (arguing that
separation of powers limits judicial lawmaking). For defenses of judicial policymaking, see REDELL
& BLOCK, supra, at 205-10 (arguing that courts are good factfinders and able administrators);
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra, at 495-501 (arguing that separation of powers demands judicial
policymaking); Stephen L. Washy, Book Review, 31 VAND. L. REV. 727, 744-47 (1978) (arguing
that legislatures and courts share comparable deficiencies in making sound policy).
8. Rosenberg considers both constitutional and statutory matters, although he limits his
inquiry to federal claims in federal courts. State court interpretations of state constitutional
provisions arc not considered at all. This is unfortunate, for state courts increasingly play a
leadership role on questions involving the exclusionary rule, freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
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tiona! behavior attributable to court action; indirect effects are courtinfluenced changes in social attitude and political behavior. Through an
examination of the immediate effect of the decision, opinion polls (measuring both awareness of Court opinions and changes in attitude as a
result of the ruling), news coverage of issues that were subject to Court
decision, and other measures, a startling conclusion is reached: court
action "seldom bring[s] reform any closer'' (p. 343) and often
"strengthen[s] the opponents of such change" (p. 342). Changes in race
relations, gender roles, criminal procedure, and the environment often
attributed to court action, instead, are the product of independent action
taken by elected government and social refonn movements.
Rosenberg's objective is not simply to deconstruct the judiciary. He
seeks to transform his findings of judicial impotence into a call for action,
not despair: social reformers accomplish more by seeking change
through "mobilizing citizens" and other "political" means than through
expensive and often counterproductive litigation (p. 343). This conclusion suggests images of the phoenix of social reform rising from the ashes
of failed judicial activism. When juxtaposed with the Relmquist Court,
whose raison d'etre often appears the repudiation of social reform-oriented judicial activism, The Hollow Hope's message is forceful. 9
The Hollow Hope, moreover, is perfectly timed. With civil rights
interests, women's groups, and environmentalists increasingly turning to
elected government and away from the courts, Rosenberg delivers a provocative justification for such behavior and encourages more of it. If
Rosenberg is correct and social reform can only be accomplished
through political means, then the Rehnquist Court is a blessing in
disguise for liberals. By refusing to play an affirmative
countermajoritarian role, the Relmquist Court may encourage populist
initiatives. If Rosenberg is wroug and the courts play a vital role in
reforming society, then the complacency of the Rehnquist Court tragically negates a critical engine for social reform.
equal educational opportunity, and privacy. See Louis Fisher, How the States Shape Constitutional
Law, STATE LEGISLATURES, Aug. 1989, at 37. In Right to Choose v. Byrne, for example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court provided broader privacy protections than the U.S. Supreme Court,
explaining that "[a]lthough the state Constitution may encompass a smaller universe than the federal
constitution, our constellation of rights may be more complete." 450 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1982). For
commentary on the importance of state constitutional interpretation, see William J. Brennan, Jr.,
State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Robert F.
Williams, State Constitutional Law: Teaching and Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL Eouc. 243 (1991). For
commentary on the ability of special interest groups to successfully advance their agenda through
state court litigation, see Donald N. Jensen & Thomas M. Griffin, The Legalization of State
Educational Policymaking in California, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS 325, 325 (David L. Kirp &
Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986) ("The result is that there are fewer areas of educational policy now left
to local discretion than ever before.").
9. See DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT (1992). The 1992 Rehnquist Court rulings on
school prayer and abortion do not dispel this suggestion. Instead, these decisions indicate that a bare
majority of the current Court is reluctant to disavow long-standing, highly controversial precedents.
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The truth, not surprisingly, lies somewhere between the image of the
Court as a vigorous agent of social change and Rosenberg's portrayal of
judicial ineffectiveness. This Review Essay will define and defend that
middle ground. In so doing, The Hollow Hope will be both vilified and
applauded. The book deserves harsh criticism because its conclusions
are checkered by problems of emphasis, articulation, and analysis. It
endorses inconsistent measures of effective judicial action, focuses on the
Court in isolation rather than as part of a larger political culture, uses
presumptions hostile to the recognition of a broad judicial role, and
employs inadequate data and questionable portrayals of existing
research. To the extent that The Hollow Hope intimates that courtordered reform is an oxymoron, these problems are fatal.
Strangely, The Hollow Hope can stand tall, if not erect, even in the
face of the deficiencies noted above. The image of judicial impotence
suggested by Rosenberg is rooted as much in the author's questionable
presentation as in his analysis. Specifically, in an effort to isolate and
quantify the Court's impact, short shrift is given to the essential role that
courts do play in "constitutional dialognes" 10 with elected government.
With little effort, Rosenberg's articulation can be recalibrated and The
Hollow Hope can serve as a testament to the fundamental role played by
nonjudicial actors in shaping constitutional values.
Rosenberg convincingly shows that courts cannot do it alone. Congress, the White House, the states, and interest groups also play a pivotal
role. State efforts to legalize abortion before Roe, congressional and
administrative efforts to eliminate dual school systems, and the civil
rights and women's movements highlight a remarkable inventory of nonjudicial influences identified by Rosenberg. The Hollow Hope also does
an extraordinary job of demonstrating that numerous landmark Supreme
Court opinions were little known and even less discussed at the time of
decision. In fact, Rosenberg's evidence of the paramount role played by
nonjudicial forces is one of the strongest to date.
The Hollow Hope then offers abundant support for a more modest,
more accurate, and equally important thesis: the Supreme Court works
within and hence both influences and is influenced by a larger culture of
political and social interests. While severe problems in analysis still
remain, this rearticulation accomplishes Rosenberg's principal objective
of sobering those who endorse an active judicial role. That this accounting is less vitriolic, less provocative, and less pathbreaking than the thesis
Rosenberg suggests seems an acceptable price for accuracy.
This Review Essay will advance this alternative formulation in the
following ways. First, this Review Essay will identify problems in
Rosenberg's articulation and analysis. Second, an alternative depiction
10. This phrase is borrowed from

LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES
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of The Hollow Hope will be suggested. This depiction will show that
Rosenberg's work-stripped of its provocative veneer-makes a good
(albeit flawed) case for seeing constitutional decisionmaking as a combination of judicial and nonjudicial forces. Moreover, through an examination of issues both discussed and ignored in The Hollow Hope, 11 this
alternative formulation will be defended. Third, this Review Essay will
suggest the significance of these findings to developing modem day strategies for seeking social reform.
I
THE HOLLOW HOPE DESCRIBED

Rosenberg begins his inquiry with a series of questions "important
for understanding the role of any political institution, yet . . . seldom
asked of courts[:] ... To what degree, and under what conditions, can
judicial processes be used to produce political and social change? What
are the constraints that operate on them? What factors are important
and why?" (pp. 1-2). Two answers are suggested-one a "constrained
view," the other a "dynamic view." The constrained view emphasizes
inherent limits in the reach of judicial authority, namely: (1) courts are
grounded "by precedent and the beliefs of the dominant legal culture"
and hence are unlikely to play the role of social crusader (pp. 10-13);
(2) the power of elected government to appoint and confirm, to strip the
courts of jurisdiction, and to argue cases deprives the judiciary of the
necessary independence to produce significant social reform (pp. 13-15);
and (3) "[c]ourts lack the tools to readily develop appropriate policies
and implement decisions ordering significant social reform" (pp. 15-21).
The dynamic view, in contrast, "sees courts as powerful, vigorous, and
potent proponents of change" (p. 2). Specifically, this model portrays
judges as well-qualified policy analysts who are willing to protect the
underrepresented and whose decisions not only are obeyed but also set
the tone of future debate (pp. 21-30). The Hollow Hope, rather than seeing the truth as somewhere between these poles, fully embraces the constrained court model.
Rosenberg concludes that "effective" and "significant" courtordered reform only takes place when nonjudicial actors support such
reform by, for example, offering incentives for compliance, imposing penalties for noncompliance, implementing the decision through pre-existing
market mechanisms, and using the decision as a justification for action
for those already willing to act (pp. 30-36). Rosenberg also concludes
11. The following topics will be considered in this Review Essay: race and education,
affirmative action, employment discrimination, women's rights, abortion, and, of course, the
legislative veto. Admittedly, my choice of topics is selective. However, since 1 consider those issues
to be at the heart of THE HOLLOW HoPE, my choices are appropriate to a review of Rosenberg's
analysis.
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that Supreme Court decisions neither reshape public discourse nor spur
on legislative and administrative initiatives. By examining press coverage, elected government action in the immediate wake of the opinion,
public recognition of the Court, and other political, social, and economic
factors at work, Rosenberg finds little evidence supporting the claim that
the Court is an effective prod. Indeed, Rosenberg finds some evidence
indicating that the Court has had an adverse influence (pp. 155-56, 182,
342). 12 Pointing to these findings, Rosenberg argues that the burden of
proof now rests on those who herald the Court's indirect influence (p.
110).

The key to these surprising conclusions is The Hollow Hope's examination of civil rights and women's rights. In both instances, Rosenberg
concludes that the Court's impact has been negligible at best and
counterproductive at worst. On civil rights, he asserts both that "courts
contributed little to civil rights" (p. 169) and that "changes in civil rights
could plausibly have happened without Supreme Court action" (p. 169).
Moreover, in a disturbing passage, he assails Brown: "By stiffening
resistance and raising fears before the activist phase of the civil rights
movement was in place, Brown may actually have delayed the achievement of civil rights" (p. 156). On women's rights, he speaks of "the lack
of judicial and extra-judicial effects of Court decisions" (p. 265), saying
that "the Court is far less responsible for the changes that occurred than
most people think" (p. 201), and that the growth of "right-to-life" forces
in the wake of Roe suggests "that one result of litigation to produce significant social reform is to strengthen the opponents of such change" (p.
342).
Rosenberg's conclusions on civil rights derive, for the most part,
from his evaluation of Brown and its aftermath. Claiming that "[t]he
Court had spoken clearly and forcefully" (p. 45) in its 1954-64 school
desegregation decisions, Rosenberg attributes the failure of southern
desegregation to constraints on the judicial power in the face of widespread hostility to Brown. For example, President Eisenhower publicly
refused to comment on the case and privately criticized the decision (p.
76), state legislatures enacted 136laws and constitutional amendments in
the three years after Brown (p. 79), and private groups resorted to violence and intimidation (ranging from newspaper publication of the names
of blacks who signed a petition in support of desegregation to the bombing of black churches and murder) (pp. 82-83). The consequence of this
12. The focus of Rosenberg's analysis is the period immediately following a Court decision.
For Rosenberg, "the more time that elapses between the order and the action, the more tenuous is
the causal link" (p. 109). Other commentators, however, argue that the impact of Court decisions is
not capable of accurate measure until some period of years has passed. See JOHNSON & CANON,
supra note 7, at 257 ("Usually some time must pass before new symbols aehieve widespread
acceptance ...."); see also infra note 26 (discussing the long-term impact of the exclusionary rule
and Miranda).
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hostility was that in the decade after Brown only 1.2% of black children
attended school with white children, demonstrating, in the words of
Rosenberg, that "Brown and its progeny stand for the proposition that
courts are impotent to produce significant social reform," (p. 71) "contribut[ing] virtually nothing to ending segregation . . . in the Southern
states" (p. 52).
Rosenberg likewise concludes that Brown did not serve as a catalyst
to other political and legal challenges to race discrimination. Recognizing that "there are no precise and exact measures that can be applied" (p.
109) to quantify indirect effects, a host of factors are considered: press
coverage, opinion polls, and legislative and executive actions that make
reference to a decision. None of these measures, in Rosenberg's estimation, indicate that Brown shaped public discourse on civil rights. For
example, media coverage of civil rights, both in large circulation
magazines (Reader's Digest, Life) and elite publications (New Republic,
New York Times Magazine), did not increase at the time of the decision
(pp. 111-16); reference to Brown in debates over civil rights legislation in
1957, 1960, and 1964 occupied "only a few dozen out of many thousands
of pages" (p. 120); public opinion on school desegregation did not change
in the immediate aftermath of Brown (pp. 127-31); Brown did not prompt
public demonstrations and marches (pp. 133-50); and financial support
for and membership in civil rights groups was unaffected by the decision
(pp. 150-55).
In finding Brown's effects inconsequential, The Hollow Hope argues
that civil rights reforms are attributable to federal action directed at
southern school systems in response to sit-ins, boycotts, and other nonjudicial pressures. 13 The conclusion that nonjudicial forces were behind
these changes is convincingly evidenced in the growth in demonstrations,
news coverage, and civil rights group support in the wake of the 1956
Montgomery bus boycott, the sit-in movement of the early 1960s, the
1961 freedom rides, and police brutality in the 1963 Birmingham demonstrations. Rosenberg charts each of these episodes and finds that both
individually and collectively, these events mattered much more than the
Brown decision (pp. 133-56). Additionally, the rise of the black electorate helped spur the federal government into action, and the south
became more receptive to change due to the influx of northern businesses
ready to invest in a desegregated south (pp. 157-62). The best that can be
said about the Court, for Rosenberg, was that it swam with and thus
13. According to Rosenberg, "[t)he actions of the Supreme Court appear irrelevant to
desegregation from Brown to the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 ESEA
[Elementary and Secondary Education Act) (p. 52)," legislation spurred on by "growing civil rights
pressure from the 1930s, economic changes, the Cold War, population shifts, electoral concerns, the
increase in mass communication" (p. 169).
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became part of a current of history; but "[t]hat current was growing in
force and . . . the Court contributed little to it" (p. 169).
Rosenberg is on strong footing in arguing that legislative reform, not
court action, prompted school desegregation. 14 In the decade following
Brown, less actual desegregation of southern schools occurred than in
1965 alone. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 15
making available billions of dollars in educational assistance, coupled
with the 1964 Civil Rights Act's (Title VI) demand that federal grant
recipients not discriminate, 16 spurred recalcitrant southern systems to
alter their segregationist practices. For example, for the 1965-66 school
year, the percentage of black children in biracial schools in Southern
states rose from two percent to six percent. 17 From 1968 to 1972, school
districts acting under federal administrative pressure were less segregated
than those acting under court order (p. 53).
The Hollow Hope's assessment of abortion and women's rights,
while less detailed and less systematic, reaches similar conclusions.
Indeed, Rosenberg uses identical metaphors, speaking of the Court as
"join[ing]," "not creat[ing]," "a current of social change and a tide of
history" (p. 265). Moreover, like his analysis of civil rights, Rosenberg
sees courts as trying to play a leadership role but failing: "[A]s with civil
rights ... the Court is far less responsible for the changes that occurred
than most people think" (p. 201); "[a]dvocates of women's rights have
'won' quite a number of legal cases" (p. 212), but "[p]recedent-setting
decisions in women's rights have produced little because courts lack all
the essential tools required of any institution hoping to implement
change" (p. 227).
Roe v. Wade, rather than being characterized as a watershed, is seen
as solidifying a "widespread, vocal, and effective" pro-choice lobby (p.
184). That forty-six state laws were invalidated under Roe is downplayed; highlighted, in its stead, are statistics showing that the rate of
legal abortions rose more dramatically the two years before Roe (300%,
from 193,500 in 1970 to 586,800 in 1972) than the two years after Roe
14. This contention is well accepted. See GARY 0RFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 356-57 (1969) (arguing
that constraints limited the courts to effecting symbolic change, and that changes in school
segregation required the mobilization of Congress and the fedeml bureaucracy); Neal Devins &
James Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation
Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1243, 1245-51 (1984) (arguing that the first major inroads to
southern school desegregation followed from the implementation of legislative reforms, not court
decisions).
IS. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.
(1990)).
16. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1981)).
17. STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH K. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION
ADMINISTERS A LAW 153 (1968).
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(52%, from 586,800 in 1972 to 898,600 in 1974) (pp. 178-80). Rosenberg
also minimizes Roe's impact by arguing that nonjudicial market mechanisms were critical in effectuating the decision. Specifically, had Roe
demanded that abortions be performed in hospitals, the widespread
refusal ofhospitals to perform abortions (only 17% of public and 23% of
private hospitals perform abortions) suggests that the case's impact
would have been negligible (pp. 189-201).
Rosenberg's examination of "women's rights" is also critical of the
Court. Noting that the gap between men's and women's earnings has
stayed constant since 1955, that litigation has not affected the wage
structure, that most employment is sex-segregated, and that the ABA
Committee on Judicial Selection typically gives better ratings to men
than women, Rosenberg deems court action in this area inconsequential
(pp. 207-12). The crux of the problem, instead, is a long list of social ills,
including domestic violence, disproportionate household work, inadequate child support, and biased laws (pp. 212-26).
Rosenberg likewise finds a limited judicial role in his analysis of
indirect judicial effects on women's rights in general and abortion in particular. Media coverage did not increase with Roe; instead, greater attention was given to abortion in the years preceding Roe than in 1973, the
year of the Court's decision (pp. 229-34). Political leaders, too, spoke
more about women's rights in the early 1970s, before a spate of "prowomen" Supreme Court decisions (pp. 234-35). Similarly, most significant changes in public opinion predate Court decisions (pp. 235-41).
Finally, a rise in membership in women's organizations did not follow
Roe, but came several years later (pp. 242- 45). Based on this analysis,
Rosenberg concludes: "I have looked at sensible and appropriate places
to find evidence [of the extra-judicial effect of Court decisions here]. The ·
evidence is not there" (pp. 245-46). While Rosenberg feels that the reasons for improvement in women's rights "may be impossible to understand or state precisely," he nonetheless finds "the lack of judicial and
extra-judicial effects of Court decisions" in the area "clear" (p. 265).
Rosenberg does not limit himself to race and gender. In a grab bag
section titled ''The Environment, Reapportionment, and Criminal Law,"
he hardly bats an eyelash in arguing that environmental litigation
"achieved precious few victories" (p. 292), that "only under unusual circumstances" (p. 303) could courts make a difference in reapportionment,
and that the "revolution" to reform the criminal law through litigation
"failed" (p. 335). Rosenberg's conclusions here, while echoing his judicial ineffectiveness theme, vary significantly from his findings on civil
rights and gender. In those extensive case studies, Rosenberg suggests
that the courts were without power-that Brown did not effect blackwhite student contact, Roe did not alter already rising abortion rates, and
women's rights decisions did not impact on the wage gap. With respect
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to the environment and criminal law, at least, Rosenberg is often concerned with whether the courts can effectively manage social change, not
whether court decisions had an impact. 18 On environmental issues, for
example, agency compliance with court orders may result in shifting
resources away from other equally important programs. By "ignor[ing]
the possible in favor of the principled," "the best-intentioned judicial
decisions may hurt rather than help the environment" (pp. 281-82). A
similar point is made in Rosenberg's description of prison reform litigation. Recognizing that "some changes have been made," Rosenberg
expresses concern over the courts' "fail[ure] to deal with 'underlying
issues and conditions' " as well as the possible positive correlation
between prison reform and prison violence (pp. 306-07). Questions over
the efficacy of such judicial stalwarts as Miranda and Gideon are also
raised: Miranda because-despite the reading of rights-the disequilibrium in power between police and suspect remains and therefore
the rate of statements to the police and confessions remains constant (p.
326); Gideon because "while the availability of counsel has increased
greatly, the legal revolution does not seem to have greatly increased the
availability of the effective assistance of counsel" (p. 331 ). To realize the
ultimate objectives of Gideon, Miranda, prison reform, and environmentallitigation, Rosenberg contends that political support is necessary (pp.
281-82, 313, 334). Until reformers "put as much time, energy, and
resources into political and social change as into litigation ... litigation
will not be effective.... The political challenge must be faced directly.
Litigation ... 'is not, of course, the real answer'" (pp. 313-14 (footnote
omitted)).
The Hollow Hope, in the end, tries to deliver a double whammy to
court-ordered change. First, the discussion of Brown, Roe, and women's
rights indicates that court-ordered change does not effect institutional
behavior. When implementing bodies are hostile to change (Brown),
court orders will be disregarded like waste paper. 19 When change occurs
(Brown, Roe), it is likely that that change would have occurred even if
the Court did not act. Second, the discussion of criminal law and the
environment suggests that compliance with court orders is a far cry from
18. There is no question that court action affected institutional behavior here. On
environmental matters, see generally MELNICK, supra note 7 (examining intended and unintended
effects of clean air litigation). On prison reform, see Samuel J. Brake!, Prison Reform Litigation: Has
the Revolution Gone Too Far?, JuDICATURE, June-July 1986, at 5 (discussing widespread court
oversight of state prison systems); Jack Drake, Judicial Implementation and Wyatt v. Stickney, 32
ALA. L. REv. 299 (1981) (discussing the impact of the first case establishing a right to treatment for
persons involuntarily committed to a state mental institution); Daryl R. Fair, Prison Reform by the
Courts, in GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS 149 (Richard A.L. Gambitta et al. eds., 1981) (arguing
that courts can change prison conditions).
19. This phrase is borrowed from LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (1958) (noting
that without final judicial review, court judgments might be little better than "waste paper" when
other branches disagreed).
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court-ordered change. In some cases (prison reform, environment),
court-ordered improvements in one area yield unintended adverse consequences in a different area. In other cases (Miranda, Gideon), technical
compliance with court orders seems meaningless because underlying conditions are not changed.
II

Do COURTS MATTER?
Rosenberg may well be correct in criticizing environmentalists, civil
rights groups, women's interests, and others for relying too much on the
courts. Rosenberg errs, however, in suggesting that the courts' impact is
nugatory. First, in reaching his ultimate conclusions on the futility of
litigation, Rosenberg treats two related but quite different issues as if they
were the same; namely (1) whether court decisions affect social institutions, and (2) whether litigation is an effective way to reform social institutions. Second, Rosenberg's measures of the direct and indirect effects
of decisions such as Brown and Roe are inaccurate. In seeking to isolate
and then measure the judicial role, Rosenberg underestimates that role.
Relatedly, his choice of case studies is subject to question. Decisions not
considered by Rosenberg, such as Bob Jones University v. United States 20
(race and education), Metro Broadcasting v. F. C. C. 21 (affirmative action),
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 22 (employment discrimination), and Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services 23 (abortion), reveal that the Court's direct
and indirect effects may be of great magnitude. In the end, the structure
of analysis in The Hollow Hope and the execution of that analytic model
suggest that Rosenberg is content in not finding a significant judicial role.
Put simply: courts-in Rosenberg's hands-seem destined to fail.
The Hollow Hope is filled with language indicative of an anti-court
bias. The book's repeated attacks on the futility of litigation do more
than simply drive home a point. By summarizing its findings in their
starkest, most extreme form, the book is far too absolutist. In contrast to
problems of overbearinguess, Rosenberg also discounts the judicial role
through an often elusive presentation. He treats interchangeably quite
different concerns about the potential of judicial reform. In the book's
introductory chapter, he questions whether "judicial processes [can] be
used to produce political and social change" (p. 1); whether courts can be
"consequential in effecting significant social reform" (p. 5); and "whether
and under what conditions courts can produce significant social reform"
(p. 6). While these measures of judicial influence are quite different,
Rosenberg views them as fungible because "[a]ll of these formulations
20. 461
21. 497
22. 401
23. 492

u.s. 574 (1983).
u.s. 547 (1990).
u.s. 424 (1971).
u.s. 490 (1989).
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suggest that courts can sometimes make a difference" (p. 5). In later
chapters and especially the conclusion, however, The Hollow Hope is
framed as a "study . . . examin[ing] whether . . . courts can produce
significant social reform" (p. 336 (emphasis added)). 24
There is another way in which Rosenberg restates his inquiry. The
ultimate purpose of The Hollow Hope is to help reformers determine
whether they should expend scarce resources on court-centered strategies
(pp. 4, 342-43). Of course, if court action has no impact, litigation is
senseless. It is possible, however, that court action may alter institutional behavior without ultimately advancing the agenda of social
reformers. For example, social reform efforts would be undermined were
a state to drop a social program rather than respond to court demands
that the program be better administered. 25 Rosenberg recognizes this
possibility. Early in the book he discusses the importance of determining
whether the "courts are effective producers of significant social reform"
(p. 6 (emphasis added)), and in the book's final section he criticizes
apparently significant court-ordered environmental and criminal reform
on effectiveness grounds. Confusing this distinctive inquiry, however,
Rosenberg in both the book's introduction and conclusion treats "significant social reform" and "effective" reform as interchangable (pp. 5-6,
338). Moreover, Rosenberg's effectiveness criticism is wanting. In his
chapters on race and gender, Rosenberg seeks to ascertain the judiciary's
influence by speculating on "what would have happened if the Court had
not acted as it did" (p. 157). In criticizing prison reform litigation,
Miranda, and Gideon, this critical question is not pursued. Despite recognizing that the most severe prison overcrowding and most deplorable
prison conditions have been eliminated (p. 306), that police routinely
read a suspect her rights (p. 326), and that access to a court-appointed
attorney has grown tremendously (p. 330), Rosenberg's effectiveness
attack on these cases never considers what the world would look like
absent judicial intervention.26 By failing to consider this matter, Rosen24. For similar articulations, see pp. 22, 32, 343. Rosenberg is a bit unclear on what he means
by "social reform." He claims that litigation affecting a single bureaucracy is outside his definition;
instead, social change is about litigation "altering bureaucratic and institutional practice
nationwide" (p. 4). At the same time, as his discussion of school desegregation and prison reform
litigation reveal, interrelated but piecemeal reform efforts fit his definition. Moreover, as is the case
with abortion, reform is often measured by individual decisionmaking and private market forces.
Consequently, this Review Essay will utilize Rosenberg's broadest articulation of social reform"policy change with nationwide impact" (p. 4).
25. This "policy" argument supports the Supreme Court's decision not to impose liability on
the state for child abuse connected to the gross negligence of a social worker. DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). For a commentary critical of this
reasoning, sec Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of
DeShaney, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1078.
26. Problems with Rosenberg's criminal law analysis are multi-fold. His analysis of Miranda's
impact relies heavily on studies conducted five years after the decision, although the case is now
twenty-five years old (pp. 326-29). Reliance on such dated material may prove misleading. See
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berg again discounts the judicial role. More significantly, his advice on
the futility of litigation seems at best presumptious.
Problems in articulation, while significant, are overshadowed by
problems in Rosenberg's measurement of judicial impact. The heart of
The Hollow Hope is its case studieS on race and gender, studies where
Rosenberg commits error by seeking to isolate the judiciary's impact. A
fuller treatment of these issues reveals that courts play a significant role
in shaping public values. This is evident both in topics examined in The
Hollow Hope and in related topics not considered by Rosenberg; namely,
busing, the tax-exempt status of private schools, affirmative action,
employment discrimination, and state responses to the Webster decision.
A.

1.

Race

The Courts and School Desegregation

Rosenberg's analysis of race and education is a mixed bag. He does
an exceptional job in showing that nonjudicial forces overshadowed the
Supreme Court in making tangible Brown 's demand for "a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."27 Without
the backing of elected government, Brown was ineffective in southern
states, holding out "great promise" but " 'heeded with all due deliberate
delay.' " 28 Furthermore, Rosenberg is clearly correct in arguing that,
rather than Brown, the moving forces in civil rights legislation were sitins, boycotts, and police brutality.29 Rosenberg, however, incorrectly
concludes that the predominance of non-judicial influences suggests an
inconsequential judicial role. This conclusion is based on a misreading of
Brown, a misunderstanding of how the case influenced others, and a failJonathan D. Casper, The Impact of Criminal Justice Innovation: Feeley on Court Reform, 1983 AM.
B. FOUND. REs. J. 959, 962 (reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY, CoURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY
SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983)) (criticizing the assessment of reform by looking only at its
immediate aftermath). Indeed, more recent studies suggest that one indirect effect of Miranda is to
reduce police violence during arrests. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON TilE KILLING
STREETS 198-203 (1991). It is also risky business in criminal proeedure issues to reach definitive
conclusions. As Thomas Davies warned in his 1983 study of the exclusionary rule, "empirical
research .•• reflects [the] tensions between empirical and doctrinal analysis ... [thereby pointing to]
the mischief that may result from basing legal policy on an inadequately researched empirical
premise." Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 611, 678.
27. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
28. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LoNGEST DEBATE 232 (1985) (quoting
Martin Luther King, Jr.). In border states, however, Brown did make a difference.
29. See id. at 232-33 (listing the forces behind the 1964 Civil Rights Act passage as national
protest, violent response, and the martialing of religious groups); see also PAUL BURSTEIN,
DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND PoLmCS 69-96 (1985) (linking passage of the Act to changes in public
opinion and to social protest); ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN TilE UNITED STATES
428 (1967) (passage of the 1964 Act explained by "a collection of events and circumstances beyond
the power of any one person to shape, control, or even channel").
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ure to examine the judicial role in race and education subsequent to the
"first decade after Brown" (pp. 74-93).
Brown, contrary to Rosenberg's assertions, was never intended to
restructure southern school systems; instead, it was an opening salvo in a
nationwide debate on race equality. At the time of the decision, the
Supreme Court was sharply divided on the question of segregated education. In fact, Justice Harold Burton's conference notes and Justice
William Douglas' autobiography reveal that a majority of the Court was
prepared to uphold "separate but equal" schools when oral arguments
were first heard in Brown. 30 Reflecting both this division and its recognition that its decision would face massive resistance in the south, the
Court was purposefully evasive in its Brown decisions. Rather than
require southern systems to take concrete steps to dismantle dual systems, the Court did not issue a remedy in Brown and then stated a year
later in Brown II that "varied local school problems" were best solved by
"[s]chool authorities," that district court judges were best suited to
examine "local conditions," and that delays associated with "problems
related to administration" were to be expected. 31
The inevitable result of this "remedial" order was inaction. As J.
Harvie Wilkinson put it, "the South was audibly relieved by Brown II, a
victory of sorts snatched from the defeat of only a year ago [in
Brown]." 32 Indeed, southern newspapers heralded the remedial order,
especially since the Court entrusted the implementation of its decision to
"[o]ur local judges [who] know the local situation.' 133 These local judges
did not disappoint segregationists, sometimes because they too opposed
Brown and sometimes because they were hesitant to fight entrenched
local institutions. 34
The Supreme Court, then, did not seek to provide the type of leadership against which one can measure changes in black-white student contact. Those efforts did not begin until 1968, when the Supreme Court
demanded, in Green v. County School Board, 35 that school boards "come
30. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE CoURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 113 (1980); S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J.
PoL 689, 691-92 (1971) (summarizing Burton's conference notes).
31. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955). See generally LOUIS FISHER &
NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 261-64 (1992) (discussing Chief
Justice Warren's attempt to craft a unanimous decision in order to temper southern hostility); J.
Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History
and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485, 488-505 (1978) (discussing Brown II and the subsequent period of
southern defiance).
32. Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 490.
33. REED SARRATr, THE ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION 200 (1966) (quoting a southern
attorney). For other comments, see Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 490.
34. See ORFIELD, supra note 14, at 15-18 (discussing the pressures on southern district court
judges in the wake of the Brown II decision); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LoNELY MEN (1961)
(same).
35.

391

u.s. 430 (1968).
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forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now." 36 What can be measured in 1964 is whether
the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown contributed to the national dialogue resulting in mid-sixties legislative and administrative reforms.
Rosenberg answers this question with a resounding no, but he is
wrong. First, both the promise and failure of Brown were lightning rods
to the civil rights movement. According to federal judge Constance
Motley, who assisted the NAACP in Brown, blacks construed the opinion to mean "that the Supreme Court was behind them . . . . Brown gave
them the courage to go into restaurants, to go on freedom rides in the
South." 37 The ultimate failure of Brown also spurred black activism by
heightening the anger felt over the continuing denial of equality. 38 Second, Brown influenced legislative deliberations over the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). On the
issue of Title VI funding prohibitions, bill sponsor Thomas Kuchel
argued that Title VI prevented "unconstitutional" expenditures of federal funds, thereby "furthering a policy of nondiscrimination, and thus
eliminating defiance of the law of the land"-in other words, Brown. 39
Hubert Humphrey similarly defended Title VI, observing that "massive
Federal funds are now being paid each year, to help construct and operate segregated schools, and thus to maintain and perpetuate a system
which violates the Constitution."40 For both Kuchel and Humphrey,
southern resistance to Brown made Title VI a moral imperative; otherwise, Congress would knowingly fund blatantly unconstitutional state
action. 41
36. Id. at 439.
37. Francis J. Flaherty, Brown, Part IlL· 30 Yea~ After 'All Deliberate Speed,' Country Still
Litigates Desegregation, NAT'L L.J., May 14, 1984, at 1, 27; see also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING
THE WATERS 124 (1988) ("[T]he Brown case had brought fresh excitement to the NAACP . ...");
Robert J. Glenuon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus Boycott,
1955-1957. 9 LAW & HIST. REv. 59 (1991) Qegal developments and the civil rights movemeut are
integrally intertwined).
38. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 28, at 232. Rosenberg responds to this argument by
claiming that "[because Brown was so little known] it does not seem likely that the Court added very
much to the level of frustration" (p. 139).
39. 110 CoNG. REc. 6562 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kuchel).
40. 110 CoNG. REC. 6543 (1964), reprinted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HtsrORY
OF THE UNITED STATES: CtVlL RIGHTS PART II 1212 (1970). Humphrey also recognized that
"[w]hat is needed, therefore, is a balance between the goal of eliminating discrimination and the goal
of providing educatiou . . . [to] minority groups." 110 CoNG. REc. 6547 (1964), reprinted in
SCHWARTZ, supra, at 1222.
41. Without Brown, the "separate but equal" doctriue would have retained vitality. Segregated
schools-as the south argued in Brown-would then have been considered separate but
nondiscriminatory. See Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry ofRace: White Innocence and Black
Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 21 (1990) (discussing the oral arguments in Brown). In
other words, without Brown, Title VI's effectiveness would have hinged ou congressional
endorsement of nondiscrimination standards at odds with Supreme Court measures. There is no
doubt that Brown made Title VI an easier sell.
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More striking, Title IV of the 1964 Act, authorizing the Justice
Department to file desegregation lawsuits, 42 seems a direct response to
Brown. Act sponsors spoke of "expediting the decade-old mandate of the
Supreme Court"43 and noted that civil rights groups lacked the funds
needed to launch separate lawsuits in each of 2,000 segregationist southem school districts. 44 The House Committee Report likewise featured
ample references to Brown: proponents spoke of "implementing the decision of the Supreme Court" and argued that "the constitutional right to
be free from racial discrimination in public education must be realized";45 opponents fretted about federal control of education and battled
for a limitation on federal efforts to achieve racial balance through busing.46 Unfortunately, Rosenberg fails to make this connection between
Title IV and Brown.
Rosenberg also ignores the connection between Brown and the
ESEA. After Brown, but prior to 1964, federal assistance to education
was doomed, in part because "[t]he storm clouds of race ... hovered over
the federal aid fight." 47 With the passage of Title VI, this battle evaporated and the ESEA was quickly enacted.48 Ironically, while Adam
Clayton Powell and other civil rights proponents fought against federal
aid to racist southern schools before 1964 (p. 123), objections to the 1965
ESEA came from southern members of Congress who were concerned
that ESEA money would be used to force desegregation. 49 Granted,
neither the ESEA nor the 1964 Act are principally about Brown. Nonetheless, Rosenberg's conclusion that "the introduction and enactment of
these bills was based on factors other than Court decisions" (p. 124)
incorrectly minimizes the Court's role.
Rosenberg also minimizes the judiciary's role by artificially limiting
his inquiry to the decade after Brown. Prior to 1968, elected government
clearly provided leadership on the school desegregation issue. Due to
federal guidelines that exceeded the requirements of federal court rulings,
the percentage of black children in all-black schools in the south dropped
42.

Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 407, 78 Stat. 241, 248 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000c-6 (1988)).
43. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 6560 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kuchel), reprinted in ScHWARTZ, supra
note 40, at 1245.
44. 110 CoNG. R.Ec. 6540 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey), reprinted in SCHWARTZ,
supra note 40, at 1205-0!).
45. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 272-77 (1964).
46. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 45, at 208. The anti-busing provision is contained
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1981).
47. EUGENE EIDENBERG & ROY D. MOREY, AN ACT OF CONGRESS 24 (1969). Brown clearly
exacerbated this "storm cloud." See BAILEY & MOSHER, supra note 17, at 21-22; EIDENBERG &
MOREY, supra, at 55; Devins & Stedman, supra note 14, at 1246-47.
48. See EIDENBERG & MOREY, supra note 47, at 55-56.
49. See ORFIELD, supra note 14, at 25; Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1723, 1741 (1991).
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from 98% in 1963 to 25% in 1968. 50 But the pendulum shifted in 1968
with the rejection of "freedom of choice" in Green 51 and the election of
Richard Nixon. Mounting concern over the extension of desegregation
to districts outside the south and heightened opposition to busing provoked a political reaction that ultimately resulted in the taming of federal
school desegregation enforcement efforts. 52 This elected-government
retreat was not matched by a judicial retreat; instead, the courts began
playing an increasingly active role, which culminated in the Supreme
Court's approval of busing in its 1971 Swann decision. 5 3
The post-Green period, while ignored by Rosenberg, is the judiciary's most significant, most controversial, and most debated foray into
court-ordered institutional reform. Battle lines were drawn, with critics
and proponents propounding vastly different viewpoints about white
flight and other forms of resegregation, educational achievement or the
lack of it, judicial factfinding and management, and school board
compliance. 54
Four things are not in debate, all of which speak to a significant-if
not dominant-judicial role. First, courts affect behavior. When court
orders result in new budgeting processes (Boston), the imposition of a
state-wide tax levy (Kansas City), the building of state-subsidized housing (Yonkers), and the freezing of U.S. Department of Education
accounts (Chicago), change occurs. 55 Furthermore, parents do send
50. See GARY 0RFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION lN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-80,
at 5 (1983).
51. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (imposing affirmative duty on school
boards to "come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistieally to
work now").
52. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 14, at 1248-51.
53. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971) (implementing busing
decree was "well within. the capacity of the school authority").
54. Scholarship defending an active judicial role includes: EDUCATIONAL EQuiTY PROJECT,
VANDERBILT UNIV., CoVERING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: A DESKBOOK FOR EDUCATION
WRITERS 111-3 (1982) (arguing that mandatory techniques of desegregation are generally more
effective than voluntary techniques); GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 2 (1978) (arguing that judges,
when pressed, chose forced busing over segregation); REDELL & BLOCK, supra note 7 (arguing that
courts are effective factfinders whose orders are generally respected); Willis D. Hawley, The New
Mythology of School Desegregation, 42 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 214 (1978) (arguing that busing
neither harms student performance nor leads to significant white flight); Willis D. Hawley & Mark
A. Smylie, The Contribution of School Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial
Integration, in PHYLLIS A. KATZ & DALMAS A. TAYLOR, ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN
CONTROVERSY 281 (1988) (arguing that desegregation improves black student achievement with no
adverse impact on white students).
Scholarship critical of the courts includes: LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE, 258-83
(1976) (portraying compelled racial integration as "self-defeating"); RICHARD A. PRIDE & J. DAVID
WoODARD, THE BURDEN OF BUSING (1985) (describing desegregation efforts in Nashville);
ELEANOR P. WOLF, TRIAL AND ERROR (1981) (portraying courts as incompetent factfinders);
David J. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB. INTEREST 90, 99 (1972) (busing produces no
academic gains for black children).
55. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (Boston), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1042 (1977); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Kansas City), aff'd as
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their children to private schools or move to other school systems in
response to school desegregation orders, although there is typically some
increase in minority-nonminority contact in the public schools. 56
Second, court decisions prompt federal legislative action. Immediately after Swann, President Nixon delivered. a national address on the
evils of busing and proposed legislation making busing a remedy of "last
resort" for school segregation, to be implemented "only under strict limitations."57 Congress refused to limit court remedial authority, but
numerous restrictions on federal financial support of mandatory busing and federal advocacy of busing have been enacted since 1972. 58
Congress' decision to limit federal enforcement and advocacy, while at
the same time preserving judicial authority, is telling. Apparently, intrusions into judicial power are "discredited and deceitful" 59 and represent
"a basic challenge to the Constitution-and the separation of the powers."60 However, intrusions into federal desegregation efforts are politics
as usual.
Third, court action or the threat of court action is nonetheless essential to meaningful school desegregation. In most instances, the political
process has not broken down and the threat of legal action prompts "voluntary" reform. Fear of overreaching court orders and the costs of litigation encourage such voluntary compliance. 61 In rare instances, school
boards look to courts to impose remedies that they support but lack the
political courage to endorse. 62 In such cases, courts are far from incidental; they are a necessary conduit to legitimate socially desirable but politically costly behavior. 63
modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987); United States v. Yonkers
Bd. ofEduc., 624 F. Supp 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. lOSS (1988); United States v. Board ofEduc., 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ill.) (Chicago), aff'd
in part and vacated in part, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983). For commentary on these cases, see
Devins & Steadman, supra note 14, at 1273-91; Robert Wood, Professionals at Bay: Managing
Boston's Public Schools, 1 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 454 (1982).
56. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES,
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 274 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989) (state action doctrine studied in light of flight to
private schools); F. Welch & A. Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation (U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights 1987) (exposure of minorities to white students increased in 74 of 125 districts
studied, although court order prompted decline in the percentage of white students).
57. H.R. Doc. No. 195, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972); see also Richard M. Nixon, Address to
the Nation on Equal Educational Opportunities and School Busing (March 16, 1972), in PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RlCHARD NIXON: CONTAINING THE PUBLIC
MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT: 1972 (1974).
58. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 267-69.
59. 118 CoNG. REc. 28,845 (1972) (statement of Rep. Badillo).
60. /d. at 28,849 (statement of Rep. Scheuer).
61. See generally DAVID KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS (1982) (describing several voluntary
desegregation efforts which were prompted by the fear of litigation).
62. /d. at 61.
63. Rosenberg infers otherwise. He views courts as incidental in such circumstances,
emphasizing that courts produce a shield for "persons crucial to implementation who are wi//ing to
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Fourth (and most visibly), courts can impose remedies on reluctant
districts. The results can vary dramatically. Sometimes judges or courtappointed special masters can work with community leaders to forge successful desegregation plans. 64 In those cases, courts play an affirmative
instrumental role. On other occasions, court orders provide little more
than a pyrrhic victory for civil rights litigants. When a school system
prefers resistance to compliance, court action is not likely to succeed.
For example, a recent study concluded that school systems can subvert
school desegregation orders by delaying the remedy, devoting fewer
resources to predominantly black schools, and aiding white flight and the
erosion of the city's tax base. 65 Whether successful compromises outnumber political debacles is an open question. What is clear is that
courts can facilitate success stories, but only when school systems are
willing players. 66
On the issue of busing, it may be that "[o]nly a reordering of the
environment" will result in racially balanced public schools. 67 That
courts cannot accomplish that task comes as no surprise. The story of
school desegregation reveals that the judiciary is only a piece in a much
larger puzzle. Support or resistance from the federal government and
local school authorities are also pieces of this puzzle (and perhaps larger
ones at that). The Supreme Court often recognizes these limits; its decisions in Brown testify to this sensitivity. That the judiciary is constrained, however, does not mean that the courts are without significant
influence. The eradication of dual southern systems has always had
Brown as its foundation; the busing controversy cannot be separated
from its judicial origins. Granted, Brown and the busing controversy are
also about politics; but, when it comes to race and schooling, "[p]olitics
act" (p. 35). The question of whether those shielded by the courts would have acted in the absence
of judicial leverage is not considered by Rosenberg.
64. For an optimistic portrayal of special masters, see Curtis J. Berger, Away from the Court
House and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 707 (1978). For a
mixed portrayal, see David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appointed
Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REv. 313 (1981). For a
negative portrayal, see Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision
of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1297-302.
65. See Paul L. Tractenberg, The View from the Bar: An Examination of the Litigator's Role in
Shaping Educational Remedies, in JusncE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS 406 (Barbara Flickered., 1990)
(summarizing results from survey of plaintiffs' attorneys in school desegregation cases).
66. A coalition of social scientists supportive of mandatory reassignments put it this way:
"[While] [s]chool districts who [sic] adopt desegregation in good faith are able to use it as an
opportunity to increase the achievement of their students, [and to] promote racial harmony ... local
officials opposed to the process of desegregation can resegregate students within the schools ... [or]
foster interracial tensions within a desegregated school." Brief of the NAACP, DeKalb County,
Georgia, Branch of the NAACP, American Jewish Committee, Children's Defense Fund, Fund for
an Open Society, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Puerto Rican Legal
Defense and Education Fund, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, app. at 25a, Freeman v. Pitts, 111 S. Ct. 2233 (1991) (No. 89-1290).
67. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 132 (1978).
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and law ... each reshapes the other." 68
2.

Civil Rights: The Story Not Told

Rosenberg's discussion of civil rights, while far-reaching, does not
consider three significant topics suggestive of a broad judicial role;
namely, tax breaks for racist schools, diversity preferences for minority
broadcasters, and employment discrimination. 69 These omissions are
unfortunate. Not only do these topics speak directly to Rosenberg's central concerns, they provide a much different image of the judicial role
than that suggested by The Hollow Hope. 70
The story of tax exemptions for segregated private schools is one of
judge-made social policy. 71 Prior to 1970, the IRS granted exemptions to
schools regardless of their admissions policies or practices. Although
civil rights interests had urged the IRS to deny tax breaks to discriminatory private schools, the Johnson administration concluded that it had no
authority to do so. In 1969, instead of seeking legislative reversal of the
IRS policy, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights filed suit on behalf
of William Green, raising statutory and constitutional objections to the
IRS policy. This strategy was successful.
The Nixon administration recognized the high political costs of
racial discrimination and responded to this lawsuit by reversing the IRS
policy and seeking to moot the Green lawsuit. 72 However, civil rights
plaintiffs, perceiving that the Nixon IRS would be lax in enforcing its
newly announced policy, asked the court both to issue a permanent
injunction against the IRS and to specify nondiscrimination enforcement
policies. In 1971, the court complied with this request. While IRS conformity to the plaintiffs' wishes raised significant adverseness problems,
the Green court nevertheless mandated that private schools seeking taxexempt status adopt and publish a policy of racial nondiscrimination. 73
The injunction issued in Green did not end the tax-exemption controversy. In 1978, the Lawyers' Committee again filed suit-this time on
68. KIRP, supra note 61, at 70.
69. Another issue revealing a broad judicial role is the civil rights interests' "capture" of the
Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Education. The source of this "capture" is a lawsuit
first filed in 1970, Adams v. BelL Writing about the case in 1984, Jeremy Rabkin observed that "the
suit has succeeded in placing this executive agency in what might be called judicial receivership,
allowing a single federal judge-and a handful of private civil rights lawyers-to determine how it
should enforce the civil rights laws Congress has confided to the agency's responsibility." Jeremy
Rabkin, Captive of the Court: A Federal Agency in Receivership, REGULATION, May/June 1984, at
16, 16.
70. Rosenberg, of course, should not be criticized for failing to discuss each and every public
law topic that bears on his thesis. Problems in selectivity, however, limit The Hollow Hope.
71. See generally FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 52-68.
72. See Thomas McCoy & Neal Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax
Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 441, 457 (1984).
73. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
u.s. 997 (1971).
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behalf of Inez Wright-asserting that the 1971 injunction was inadequate. Prodded by the pending litigation, the IRS under Carter proposed-consistent with plaintiffs' demands-regulations denying taxexempt status to private schools enrolling an insignificant number of
minority students.74
The Carter proposal never took effect, however. Prompted by an
overwhelmingly negative public response, including 150,000 angry letters, Congress denied any funds to the IRS to enforce the proposed policy.75 In explaining this measure, amendment sponsor John Ashbrook
claimed: "Isolated court decisions and ex parte agreements with litigants
of pending legal actions against the IRS have brought the IRS into criticism for permitting itself to be used as an instrument to implement certain social policies."76
The Carter IRS controversy was exploited by presidential candidate
Ronald Reagan. In an appeal to the growing voting block of Christian
fundamentalists (whose schools would have been adversely affected by
the Carter proposal), Reagan campaigned on a platform attacking "Mr.
Carter's IRS Commissioner" for his "regulatory vendetta . . . against
independent schools."77
The battleground on which the Reagan administration sought to
implement this campaigu pledge ultimately centered around Bob Jones
Uuiversity. The issue in Bob Jones University, 78 however, was not the
expansive nondiscrimination regulations proposed by the Carter IRS. In
1976, the IRS had applied the Nixon policy to revoke the tax-exempt
status of Bob Jones University, a South Carolina college which prohibited interracial dating as a matter of religious conviction. In response,
the university filed suit-a suit which worked its way up to the Supreme
Court where certiorari was granted in 1981. On January 8, 1982, the
Reagan administration reversed the IRS nondiscrimination policy and
petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate as moot Bob Jones University. 19
A barrage of criticism from newspapers and civil rights groups followed in the wake of this policy reversal. Ultimately, through a bizarre
combination of circumstances, the administration sought to return this
issue to the Court, withdrawing its mootness petition and requesting that
74. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296-97 (1978). In testimony before Congress, IRS Commissioner Jerome
Kurtz referred to conversations between the Service and civil rights attorneys leading up to the
proposed regulations. Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 860-64 (1979) (testimony
of Jerome Kurtz).
75. Treasury Department Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (1988)). See generally Neal Devins, Regulation of Government
Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE LJ. 456.
76. 125 CoNG. REc. 18,444 (1979) (statement of Rep. Ashbrook).
77. 1980 Republican Party Platform Text, reprinted in 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 63-B (1980).
78. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
79. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 57.
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the Court appoint a "counsel adversary" to defend the Nixon policy. 80
The Court complied with the government's unorthodox request and
appointed William Coleman to argue the "government's side" in these
cases, thus permitting the case to proceed despite its apparent inability to
satisfy the adverseness requirement. 81
In May 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that racially discriminatory
schools are statutorily prohibited from receiving federal tax-exempt status. The Court explicitly repudiated the Reagan administration's claim
that the IRS lacked statutory authority to enforce a nondiscrimination
requirement. 82 At the same time, by recognizing "broad [IRS] authority" to administer the tax laws, Bob Jones University eschews judicial
imposition of Carter-like standards. 83
Whether this type of court-directed policymaking is as effective or
efficient as what politicians-left to their own devices-would have produced is subject to debate. Undoubtedly, elected government eventually
would have adopted a nondiscrimination policy. Moreover, public outcry at both the Carter and Reagan initiatives helps explain judicial participation in and resolution of the tax-exemption controversy.
Nonetheless, without judicial intervention, a remarkably different story
would be told. Each step of this policymaking process was a by-product
of judicial action. Courts either made policy contrary to IRS interpretations or provided an excuse for the IRS to advance civil rights interests.
That the adverseness requirement was tossed aside in both Green and
Bob Jones University in order to accomplish larger political ends did not
deter the courts in this policymaking enterprise.
Another example of court policymaking contrary to elected branch
wishes is the judicial establishment of diversity preferences for minorities
competing for FCC broadcast licenses. 84 Prior to 1973, FCC civil rights
enforcement focused on the elimination of pernicious discrimination by
its license holders. This focus changed with TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, a 1973
D.C. Circuit decision requiring the Commission to provide a comparative preference to racial minorities in order to serve program diversity
objectives. 85
TV 9 was an appeal of the FCC's refusal to value minority status in
according a broadcast license. The Commission's position was that
80. See McCoy & Devins, supra note 72, at 463-64.
81. See id.
82. The Court held that tax-exempt institutions' operations must not be "contrary to a
fundamental public policy" and that "there can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination in
education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice." Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at
592.
83. Id. at 596.
84. See generally Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight,
69 TEX. L. REv. 125 (1990) (asserting that Metro Broadcasting demonstrates that claims of the
ascendancy of a new Supreme Court era are premature).
85. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
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"[t]he 'Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color blind. What
the Communications Act demands is service to the public . . . and that
factor alone must control the licensing processes, not the race, color or
creed of an applicant.' " 86 In other words, the FCC rejected the minority
ownership-diversity programming nexus in 1973.
Through a certiorari petition filed by then Solicitor General Robert
Bork, the FCC sought Supreme Court review of TV 9. Despite FCC
claims that minority preferences "raise the most serious constitutional
questions" and that the appellate court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Commission, 87 the Supreme Court refused to hear
the case. The Commission accordingly instructed its administrative law
judges to afford comparative merit to applicants when minority owners
were to participate in the operation of the station.
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved this issue, upholding this
and other preferences in its 1990 Metro Broadcasting v. FCC decision. 88
Disregarding the judicial origins of the comparative preference, the
Court rested its decision on the deference owed Congress because of its
"institutional competence as the national legislature.'' 89 Congress,
admittedly, has strongly backed these preferences for at least a decade. 90
Whether Congress or the FCC would have established the preferences
without the TV 9 decision is another matter. Without doubt, strong
FCC opposition to TV 9 shows that elected government was not about to
adopt this preference in 1973.
Diversity preferences and the tax-exempt status of private schools,
while important, pale in comparison to the transformative role played
by the Supreme Court in employment discrimination. Here, Congress
affirmatively delegated to the judiciary the task of specifying the reach of
employment discrimination protections. The courts seized this opportunity and, in 1971, put into effect debatable statutory interpretations
championed by civil rights interests and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. While court action was encouraged by Congress and advanced agency objectives, the Supreme Court was the indisputable lead actor in this saga.
The principal issue here is the Court's endorsement of disparate
impact proofs of employment discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power
86. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17 (1972) (quoting paragraph 872 of the
Initial Decision).
87. Petition of the United States for a Writ of Certiorari at 12-14, 16-17, TV 9, (No. 74-31),
reprinted in FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 296-97.
88. 497 u.s. 547 (1990).
89. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990).
90. See Devins, supra note 84, at 150-55 (citing lottery statutes containing diversity
preferences, which were enacted by Congress in response to its findings that past racial and ethnic
discrimination had resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media).
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Co. 91 Griggs has been embraced as "a major instrument of social progress"92 and criticized both for its "halting and embarrassed" handling of
the legislative history 93 and as a "one-sided pro-plaintiffmeasure." 94 The
case remains controversial today; President Bush's failed attempt to
characterize the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a "quota bill" rested on the
administration's repudiation of Griggs. 95
Griggs' centerpiece status, in large measure, is a by-product of
Congress' 1964 decision to rely on the courts and not the EEOC to effect
Title VII employment discrimination protections. Congress opted for a
judicial model over an administrative model because it feared that the
EEOC would abuse administrative "cease and desist" power. 96 Senator
Everett Dirksen, a key Republican opponent to administrative enforcement, viewed "a new mission agency like the EEOC" as a "threat of
potential harassment to employers." 97 During the course of negotiations
with Democratic sponsors, Dirksen succeeded in statutorily limiting the
EEOC's role to complaint processing. Enforcement was to take place in
the courts principally through private individual suits and occasionally
through "pattern or practice" suits filed by the Department of Justice.
Senate Republicans were also successful in limiting the sweep of
employment discrimination protections. Amendment sponsors adopted
clarifying amendments that rejected preferential treatment on the basis of
racial imbalance, protected bona fide seniority systems, permitted the use
of nondiscriminatory professionally developed ability tests, and restricted
judicial relief to instances where an employer intentionally engaged in an
unlawful employment practice. 98 Opponents of disparate impact proofs
point to statutory language and statements by the 1964 bill sponsors indicating that the title requires "a showing of intentional violation . . . in
order to obtain relief," 99 that "the concept of discrimination ... has no
91. 401 u.s. 424 (1971).
92. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63
Clu.-KENT L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1987) ("Few decisions in our time .•• have had such momentous social
consequences.").
93. HoROWITZ, supra note 7, at IS. See generally Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on

the Theory, Problems and Origin ofthe Adverse Impact Definition ofEmployment Discrimination and
a Recommendation/or Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (198S) (examining adverse impact theory of
discrimination under Title VII and arguing that courts should return to narrower theory based on
intent).
94. HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF AFFIRMATIVE
AcnoN 44 (1991).
9S. See Neal Devins, Groups v. Individuals, 1992 PUB. INT. L. REV. liS (reviewing BELZ,
supra note 94).
96. See HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 146 (1990); George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U.
CHI. L. REv. 688, 690-96 (1980).
97. GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 146.
98. See BELZ, supra note 94, at 2S.
99. 110 CoNG. REc. 12,723 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
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hidden meanings," 100 and that the "[racial quota] bugaboo has been
brought up a dozen times; but it is nonexistent." 101 By contrast, proponents of disparate impact proofs suggest that this statutory language is
ambiguous, especially since the 1964 Congress defeated amendments
prohibiting discrimination "solely" on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 102
However one reads the legislative history, the judiciary's paramount
role in defining Title VII is indisputable. Griggs critic Herman Belz
argues that "[t]he judiciary made its own political judgments about ...
the need to revise the basic concepts of the Civil Rights Act to meet what
it considered the public policy needs of the later 1960s and 1970s." 103
Griggs defender George Rutherglen, while recognizing that the judicial
enforcement model is a by-product of Congress' "fear that the EEOC
would enforce the statute too vigorously," sees the decision as a permissible exercise of the discretion that Congress granted the federal courts. 104
The judicial role in Griggs also illustrates how administrative agencies and federal courts can work in tandem. The EEOC relied on the
judiciary to transform Title VII from what was-according to the
NAACP's Jack Greenberg-a "weak, cumbersome, [and] probably
unworkable" set of provisions, into "the best available weapon" in the
civil rights arsenal. 105 Despite the 1964 Congress' explicit prohibition of
EEOC-initiated litigation, the EEOC advised civil rights litigants and
filed amicus briefs. In Griggs, the Commission argued that Title VII outlawed employer practices "which prove to have a demonstrable racial
effect." 106 Although the EEOC recognized that its interpretation sought
"to maximize the effect of the statute on employment discrimination
without going back to Congress for more substantive legislation," 107
Griggs approved this reading, in part, because of the principle of defer100. Id. at 7213 (joint memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case).
101. I d. at 6549 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). For a summary of these remarks and others,
see GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 150-52.
102. See id. at 13,837-38. For an analysis of these failed amendments, see Rutherglen, supra
note 96, at 713-20.
103. BELZ, supra note 94, at 43.
104. Rutherglen, supra note 96, at 696.
105. James Harwood, Battling Job Bias: Rights Groups May Ask Stiffening of '64 Law's
Employment Provisions, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1965, at 1.
106. GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 249 (emphasis omitted) (quoting EEOC Commissioner Samuel
Jackson). See generally id. at 244-50 (discussing EEOC's efforts to use statistical evidence and
disparate impact theory to demonstrate discrimination).
107. That is how the Chamber of Commerce described the EEOC's argument in Griggs. Brief
Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America at 7, Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (No. 124, 1970 Term) (quoting Alfred Blumrosen,
Administrative Creativity: The First Year of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 38
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 695, 702-03 (1970). Blumrosen was a participant in many EEOC policy
determinations between 1965 and 1967.). The EEOC's administrative history supports this
characterization. See GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 248-50.
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ence to administrative interpretation. 108
Congress, the White House, and civil rights interests reexamined
this judicial enforcement model shortly after Griggs. Surprisingly, in
debates over 1972 amendments to Title VII, all sides ultimately agreed
that the judicial enforcement model best served their interests. The
Nixon administration, following the lead of Senate Republicans in 1964
but apparently oblivious to Griggs and other expansive interpretations,
opposed the granting of cease and desist power to the EEOC in favor of
an expanded judicial enforcement model. 109 Civil rights groups also supported the continued use of this model. Emphasizing the dangers of regulatory agencies becoming "captive" to the regulated industry, civil
rights interests concluded that a weaker institutional framework (one in
which the Commission did not have cease and desist authority) enables
civil rights advocates to use federal courts "which are favorable to their
demands." 110
Congress followed suit and its 1972 amendments to Title VII fortified the judiciary's leadership role in defining employment discrimination
protections. These amendments, while neither endorsing nor repudiating
Griggs, strengthened judicial remedy authority and authorized EEOCinitiated litigation. 111 Furthermore, by endorsing the judicial enforcement model, Congress denied itself some of the traditional tools of oversight (for example, conformation, appropriations, legislative veto) in
shaping the development of Title VII. Congress, instead, could only
express its dissatisfaction with judicial decisionmaking by statutory
amendment.
Congress and the White House continue to support judicial enforcement. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, efforts to amend Title VII were
thwarted by both civil rights interests and the Republican right, for both
sides thought that the courts would prove more receptive to their arguments than the Congress. 112 In 1991, a painful impasse between the
White House and Congress over the burden of proof an employer bears
in defending a disparate impact suit was resolved by deferring the matter

108. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) ("The administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference.").
109. See BELZ, supra note 94, at 73; GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 420-49.
110. GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 431 (quoting Alfred Blumrosen); see also BELZ, supra note 94,
at 76 ("The New York Times reflected the administration's success in winning over liberal opinion
when it . • . praised the bill as a moderate alternative that sought to achieve 'nonpartisan
enforcement of the law ... through reliance on the courts [rather] than upon a politically appointed
commission.' ").
111. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)).
112. See Steven Hofman, Civil Rights: Stiffed from Both Sides, WASH. PoST, July 19, 1989, at
A23.
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to judicial resolution. II 3
The degree to which judicial enforcement of Title VII transformed
the workplace is subject to debate. No one disputes that the gap between
black and white male wages narrowed dramatically from 1965-1985. For
some, however, Title VII is of little consequence in explaining this
change; they argue that Title VII merely reinforced existing trends. II 4
Other skeptics are more timid, arguing that the evidence is unclear.U 5
For most, however, Title VII enforcement-especially Griggs-has significantly changed the workplace. Dramatic changes in minority and
female opportunities during the 1970s and the market mechanism of
employer incorporation of Supreme Court decisions into employment
practices to stave off costly litigation both suggest that Title VII has
played a significant role.II 6 Moreover, whether one views Title VII as
marginal or magnificent, all agree that judicial enforcement has made a
difference; the debate concerns how much of a difference.
The above discussion suggests an extraordinary judicial role in
employment discrimination.· Yet, this evidence can be turned around to
depict the court as a subordinate player. After all, the judicial enforcement model reflects elected government preferences. Moreover, leading
Supreme Court decisions generally reinforce EEOC interpretations.
Finally, to the extent that Title VII-rather than preexisting national
trends-altered employment practices, market mechanisms, not judicial
decisions, provided the moving force.
This characterization may not be inaccurate but it distorts the truth.
The truth is that courts operate in conjunction with-not in isolation
from-elected government and market forces. That elected government
prefers that the courts make policy does not mean that the courts do not
make policy. Likewise, even though the argument may have been
advanced by an agency, it is still the court which affirmatively puts it into
effect. Moreover, what of the many instances where the courts reject
EEOC interpretations? Finally, to say that market mechanisms effectuate court decisions is to say very little. After all, it is the court decision
which prompts employers to incorporate potential liability in their
employment decisions.
Title VII, diversity preferences, and the private school tax exemption controversy are powerful counterpoints to Rosenberg's efforts to
113. See Ruth Marcus, Compromise on Civil Rights Bill Skirts Controversial Definition, WASH.
PoST, Oct. 26, 1991, at A6.
114. See THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 133, 134 (1984); James P.
Smith, Race and Human Capital, 14 AM. EcoN. REv. 685 (1984).
115. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE EcONOMIC PROGRESS OF BLACK MEN IN AMERICA
6 (1986) ("Existing research has not been able to assess fully the effects of specific civil rights
programs and policies on the economic status of bJacks.").
116. See Freeman, Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who Has Gained and Why?, in
STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 247 (S. Rosen ed., 1981).
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downplay the Court's impact. In all three areas, court interpretations
redefined statutory language. While the elected branches both actively
participated in this process and often encouraged judicial resolution of
these issues, the policy directives nonetheless came from the courts.
Moreover, court decisions in these areas-at least sometimes-rebuffed
arguments made by the EEOC, the IRS, the FCC, and the Department
of Justice. In these instances, only a statutory amendment could undercut the courts' interpretations. The two-year struggle over the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 highlights the difficulty of legislative repeal.U 7
Despite these difficulties, elected government still preferred to give the
courts the last word both on the private school tax exemption issue 118
and the 1991 Civil Rights Act's dangling burden of proof issue. To say
that the judiciary emerges as a key player in these three prominent civil
rights dramas neither overstates the case nor calls into question the critical role played by the other branches. It simply recognizes that all three
branches engage in an ongoing policymaking dialogue.
B.

Gender

The women's rights movement is a story of political and social
reform, not judicial reform. With few exceptions (most notably abortion), the courts left it to the legislative and executive branches to serve
as the catalyst for change. 119 The refusal of elected government to put
into effect court decisions therefore does not explain the defeat of the
Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), the persistence of the earnings gap,
or the unequal consequences of divorce. Rosenberg is correct in recognizing the predominant role of political and social influences here. But as
usual, his treatment of gender issues is unsatisfactory. He overstates
judicial efforts to achieve equal rights only to blame the courts for failing
to narrow the wage gap or otherwise change the position of women in
society. More siguificantly, Rosenberg treats Roe as a non-event by discounting its precedential, political, and practical siguificance. While correct in placing the abortion issue in a broader social and political context,
Rosenberg unnecessarily distorts the judicial role along the way. This
distortion is especially clear when Rosenberg's own measures of judicial
effectiveness are extended to the 1989 Supreme Court decision Webster v.
117. Amazingly, the 1991 Civil Rights Act overturned seven Supreme Court decisions. See
Marcus, supra note 113 (front page story the day after Senate approval). For further discussion of
statutory reversals, see FISHER, supra note 10, at 206-09, 255-70.
118. When the Bob Jones University case was before the Court, Congress-for the first time in
four years-declined to authorize appropriations-based restrictions on IRS nondiscrimination
enforcement so as to give the Supreme Court the "last word" on this issue. See 128 CONG. REC.
28,068-76 (1982); Devins, supra note 75, at 494-98.
119. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 302-32; JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND
INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN (1991).
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Reproductive Health Services. 120

1.

Equal Rights

Not until 1971 did the Supreme Court strike down a law as
improper gender discrimination. 121 Prior to 1971, the judicial record for
defending women's rights has been described as "ranging from poor to
abominable." 122 Rosenberg recognizes this, but suggests that the Court
has been actively pro-women since 1971. For him, "the clear import of
the [post-1971] decisions was that gender-based distinctions would seldom be accepted" (pp. 204-05), that "[a]dvocates of women's rights have
'won' quite a number oflegal cases" (p. 212), and that judges and justices
are "earnest[]" champions of women's rights (p. 226).
Rosenberg's assessment here is subject to question. First, increasing
judicial scrutiny of gender classifications is a by-product of legislative
reform. The push for the ERA was, in some measure, a response to judicial inertia. ERA proponent Martha Griffiths castigated the Supreme
Court, claiming that there are "no worse legislators in this country than
those sitting on the Supreme Court" 123 and that the ERA fight "is not a
battle between the sexes ... [but] a battle with the Supreme Court." 124
Representative Griffiths' rebuke was typical; others in Congress spoke of
the "default of our judicial system,'ms that "the courts have abrogated
their responsibility," 126 and that the ERA was necessary to "prod the
courts into taking long-overdue action." 127 These efforts hit paydirt.
While the ERA ultimately failed, the Supreme Court explicitly took the
proposed amendment into account in Frontiero v. Richardson, 128 a 1973
decision in which the Court held-for the first time-that gender classifications were subject to heightened review. Since 1973, moreover,
Supreme Court gender cases-even those upholding classificationsalmost always invoke arguments advanced by ERA sponsors. 129 Indeed,
the ultimate defeat of the ERA is sometimes attributed to the Court's de
facto adoption of the Amendment obviating the need for an ERA. 130
120. 492 u.s. 490 (1989).
121. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (refusing to give effect to an Idaho statute which
established an automatic preference for males when selecting executors of wills).
122. John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in
Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 676 (1971).
123. 117 CoNG. RE.c. 35,296 (1971) (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
124. 116 CONG. RE.c. 28,004 (1970) (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
125. /d. at 28,028 (statement of Rep. Mink).
126. /d. at 28,023 (statement of Rep. Halpern).
127. /d. at 35,452 (statement of Rep. Bayh).
128. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute that required husbands of
servicewomen to prove dependency before being granted dependency benefits, but granted such
benefits automatically to wives of servicemen).
129. See Leslie F. Goldstein, The ERA and the U.S. Supreme Court, 1 RES. L. & PoL'Y STUD.
145 (1987).
130. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 47 (1986) ("The fact that the ERA
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Second, increasing judicial scrutiny of gender classifications has not
proven a boon to women's interests in court. The Court seems quite willing to uphold "benign" classifications which reinforce gender stereotypes
as well as classifications rooted in "real sex differences." 131 The most
notorious of these decisions, Michael M. v. Superior Court 132 and
Rostker v. Goldberg, 133 have spawned a "cottage industry" 134 of criticism
for the Court's failure to consider "[t]he central and inevitable role of
culture in determining the existence of most sex ditferences." 135 The
judiciary has also refused to narrow the earnings gap by imposing "comparable worth" and other wage equalization measures.
Rosenberg's conclusion that "court-ordered change in women's
rights has changed little" (p. 227) mistakenly suggests that judicial activism has failed to produce meaningful change. 136 The courts have not
been active in the area of women's rights, and consequently the persistence of inequality cannot be characterized as a failed judicial experiment. Rosenberg seems to recognize the courts' diminutive role on the
pay equity issue, noting that where "comparable worth policies have
been instituted, they have been the result of collective bargaining and
state government action, not litigation" (p. 208). Thus, while concluding
that "the change that has occurred does not appear to be a result of
judicial action" (p. 209), Rosenberg treats failed judicial activism and the
failure of the courts to take the lead as one and the same. However, the
failure of the courts to take the initiative, or to become involved at all,
does not prove that the courts are incapable of bringing about social
change.

would have had no significant immediate tangible impact on most women's lives dramatically
influenced the ways that both pro- and antiforces thought about and argued for the ERA.");
GILBERT Y. STEINER, CoNSTITUTlONAL INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT 36 (1985) ("With each such [Court] victory, some enthusiasts for the ERA
los[t] interest.").
131. See Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE
L.J. 913 (1983) (assessing Court treatment of issue); Neal E. Devins, Gender Justice and its Critics,
76 CALIF. L. REv. 1377, 1384-92 (1988) (book review) (summarizing feminist approaches); Nadine
Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1686 (1980) (highlighting the difficulty of distinguishing
that which is benign from that which reinforces stereotypes).
132. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding California statute that makes males and not females
criminally liable for violating the "statutory rape" law). For an analysis, see Frances Olsen,
Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REv. 387, 413-29 (1984).
133. 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding a federal statute that authorized the registration of males
and not females for possible military service). For a discussion of recent legislative reforms, see
FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 326-27.
134. This phrase, although originally used in a slightly different context, is borrowed from
Sylvia A. Law, Re~hinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 983 (1984).
135. Freedman, supra note 131, at 947.
136. Cultural barriers identified by Rosenberg might well deflect court-ordered change, but this
is not what Rosenberg argues.

HeinOnline -- 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1056 1992

1992]

2.

JUDICIAL MATTERS

1057

Abortion: Roe and Its Aftermath

Supreme Court abortion decisions are grist for the Rosenberg mill.
Rosenberg limits Roe's significance, both at the time of decision ("[in
1973,] abortion was not a radical departure from current American
beliefs, practices, and concerns" (p. 182)) and in the years following the
decision ("[years where] opposition to abortion strengthened and grew"
(p. 182)). In fact, Rosenberg depicts Roe's import as especially limited
since market forces ensured that the decision would reinforce existing
abortion trends rather than lead to a backlash limiting abortion availability (pp. 195-201). There is some appeal to these controversial claims;
political and market forces have indeed played an instrumental role in
the abortion controversy. Rosenberg, however, overextends his data and
his analysis. The Court's role may not be exclusive but it is pivotal.
Roe was controversial from the start. Rather than "a modest extension of a well-accepted right" (p. 181) to use contraceptives, Roe marked
a radical departure, and ultimately resulted in the overturning of 46 state
laws. 137 That nineteen states had liberalized criminal statutes governing
abortion in the decade preceding Roe does not undermine the case's significance. Abortion reform efforts, while on the rise, typically involved
the exemption of rape, incest, and medical necessity from criminal abortion statutes, not more far-reaching repeals of criminal abortion statutes. 138 Moreover, immediately before Roe, reform initiatives suffered
surprising defeats in both Michigan and North Dakota. 139
Roe also made a difference. Statistics revealing the prevalence of
pre-Roe abortions demonstrate that the rise of abortions is attributable to
much more than a single Supreme Court decision. It is wrong to read
anything more into these statistics, however. First, Roe helps explain the
rise in the number oflegal abortions from 586,800 in 1972 to 1,553,900 in
1980 (p. 180). 140 Roe's checking of state power enabled market mechanisms to make economic abortions more readily available. For example,
137. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 12·81 (1991) (explaining "principled"
distinction between Reagan administration endorsement of Griswold and disavowal of Roe);
MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE R.lsiNG: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
THE BoRK NOMINATION 257·58 (1989) (discussing the decision of the anti·Bork forces to focus on
Bork's opposition to Griswold, not Roe); John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Woft A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (1973) (depicting Roe as a "strange case" for the Court to begin
"second·guessing legislative balances"). For a depiction of Roe as a logical follow·up to Griswold,
see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABsOLUTES 92·95 (1990).
138. See EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, PoLmCS, AND THE CoURTS: ROE V. WADE AND ITS
AFTERMATH 11·29 (1987); TRIBE, supra note 137, at 39·51.
139. See John E. Jackson & Maris A. Vinovskis, Public Opinion, Elections, and the "Single·
Issue" Issue, in THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 64, 72 (Gilbert Y. Steiner
ed., 1983).
140. Rosenberg suggests that Roe was little known at the time of decision. That may be-in
part, because former President Johnson died the day Roe was decided and the U.S. withdrawal from
Vietnam began within a few weeks of the decision. See JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 7, at 5. Yet,
whether or not Roe was known, the ramifications of the case were known. Witness, as Rosenberg
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the number of women who could not obtain an abortion shrunk from
over 1,000,000 in 1973 to less than 600,000 in 1977. 141 In freeing the
market (especially in authorizing nonhospital abortions), Roe also helped
diminish the psychological costs of the abortion procedure. 142 Second
(and relatedly), Roe has spurred changes in access to abortion in the
most restrictive states (due to increased availability) and among poor
women (due to increased affordability). 143 Third, the abortion procedure
has became safer as a consequence of Roe. From 1963 to 1973, the abortion death rate was roughly 5. 7 per million persons, with criminal procedures accounting for 75% of abortion deaths from 1940 to 1972. 144
After Roe, the number of maternal deaths fell from pre-Roe figures of 57
per year to 6 in 1974, 3 in 1976, and none in 1979. 145
The key to this impact, as Rosenberg rightly observes, is the availability of safe and economic abortion providers. Correspondingly, Roe is
less important in jurisdictions where there are no abortion providers (pp.
192-93). For this reason, Rosenberg argues that the refusal of many hospitals to perform abortions suggests that Roe would have been ineffective
had the Court approved hospital-only abortions (pp. 189-91, 198). 146
None of this suggests that the Court is ineffective, however. The Court
did authorize nonhospital abortions, thereby staving off potential implementation problems. 147 More important, Roe created its own implementing market by creating a need for nonhospital abortion providers.
notes, the increased availability of abortion providers (pp. 196-97) and the continuing rise in legal
abortions (p. 180).
141. See Jacqueline D. Forrest et al., Abortion in the United States, 1976-1977, 10 FAM, PLAN.
PERSP. 271, 272 (1978).
142. See Brief for Amici Curiae American Psychological Association, National Association of
Social Workers, Inc., and the American Jewish Committee in Support of Petitioners/CrossRespondents in Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309 and in Support of Appellees in No. 88-805, Ohio v. Akron
Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Nos. 88-805, 88-1125, 88-1309) (suggesting that
adolescents do not typieally lack the capacity to make sound health care decisions, including
decisions about abortion).
143. See Susan B. Hansen, State Implementation of Supreme Court Decisions: Abortion Rates
Since Roe v. Wade, 42 J. POLI11CS 372, 379 (1980).
144. /d. at 378.
145. See Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1, 185-86 (1984).
146. Rosenberg does not consider the possibility that-had Roe approved costly hospital-only
abortions-market forces would have provided sufficient monetary incentives for many hospitals to
perform abortions.
147. Rosenberg overlooks the fact that the Supreme Court establishes its own precedents. The
Hollow Hope argues, instead, that judicial policymaking is constrained, in part, because courts
ground their decisions in preexisting precedents (pp. 10-13). For example, Brown and Roe are
depicted as slight extensions of existing doctrine and therefore subject to judicial resolution (pp. 7273, 181-82). This characterization of Brown and Roe is subject to question. See TRIBE, supra note
137, at 39-51. More troubling, Rosenberg refuses to acknowledge that the Court-not special
interests or elected government-chose to promulgate legislative standards in Roe and chose to defer
to state government in Brown. Right or wrong, these decisions were made by the Court, and the
measure of judicial impact should be predicated on what the Court did decide.
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Not surprisingly, the suppliers shortly followed. 148 As Rosenberg recognizes: "In the wake of the Court decisions there was a sharp increase in
the number of abortion providers" (p. 196). This self-implementing
characteristic distinguishes Roe from Brown. 149 In Brown, the Court
decision did not create its own market mechanism; instead, external
incentives (federal funding prohibitions) were required to secure compliance from southern states which otherwise preferred one-race schools. 150
Roe 's self-executing nature also helps explain the rise of the "right
to life" movement and, with it, anti-abortion legislation. By providing
women an unqualified abortion right in the first trimester of pregnancy,
abortion rights advocates' principal objective had become a constitutional mandate. Consequently, rather than seeking to liberalize abortion,
reform efforts were now the province of groups who sought to chip away
at, if not destroy, Roe. By this measure, the greater Roe's practical and
symbolic importance, the more vociferous the anti-abortion movement.
If one measures a case's impact by the strength of the opposition,
Roe's landmark status is assured. 151 From 1973 until 1989, 48 states
passed 306 abortion measures, 152 which varied in severity from nonobtrusive reporting requirements to parental and spousal consent laws.
This degree of state activity in the face of Roe's stringent trimester
approach is staggering. The principal weapons of Roe opponents were
attempts to make abortion less attractive through so-called "burden creation" strategies. These strategies included increasing the risks of undergoing an abortion (statutes forbidding a safe abortion method-saline
amniocentesis-while permitting more dangerous abortion techniques);
reducing accessibility to medical facilities that perform abortions (stat148. There was only a limited supply of abortion providers at the time of Roe, and it took more
than a year for market forces to begin to make the abortion right available in many jurisdictions. See
JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 7, at 7.
149. Supreme Court employment discrimination decisions, like Roe and unlike Brown, created
their own implementing market. Through attorney fee provisions and backpay awards, employees
and litigators have incentives to file suit against allegedly discriminatory employers. For a related
argument, see Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28
STAN. L. REv. 207, 248-50 (1976). Relatedly, one of President Bush's principal objections to the
1991 Civil Rights Act's codification of Griggs was that employers would engage in "quota" hiring to
stave off costly litigation. See Devins, supra note 95.
150. Correspondingly, agency enforcement of Title VI nondiscrimination prohibitions were
subject to extensive political control whereas judicial enforcement of Title VII could only be checked
by specific overruling legislation. See Devins, supra note 49, at 1741-43.
151. In the words of Judge Robert Bark: "Attempts to overturn Roe will continue as long as
the Court adheres to it. . . . Roe, as the greatest example and symbol of the judicial usurpation of
democratic prerogatives in this century, should be overturned." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA 116 (1990). That elected government seeks to minimize the effect of a Supreme Court
decision suggests that Court action makes a difference. Rosenberg does not consider this possibility;
instead, he cites state responses to limit Brown and Roe as evidence that Court action may well be
counterproductive (pp. 156, 342).
152. See Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, 20 Puauus 27, 32
(1990).
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utes demanding that all abortions be performed in a hospital and zoning
laws restricting the number of abortion clinics); increasing the cost of
abortions (statutes requiring physician or pathologist involvement in
abortion procedures); and establishing detailed pre-abortion procedures
(statutes requiring women to be informed of the "medical risks" of abortion and to wait at least twenty-four hours after consenting to the abortion procedure). 153 During this period, however, the Supreme Courtthrough ten highly restrictive decisions-stymied most of these reform
efforts. 154
The federal government also played a large role in the abortion dispute. 155 Before Roe, the federal government rarely involved itself in the
ferocious battle between pro-life and pro-choice state activists. Indeed,
in the decade before the decision, only ten abortion-related bills were
introduced in Congress. 156 Since Roe, Congress has repeatedly tackled
the abortion issue; during the decade after Roe, 500 abortion bills were
introduced. 157 Congress' record here is a mixed one, having accepted
numerous restrictions on federal abortion funding, prohibited the performance of abortions at military hospitals and federal penitentiaries,
and funded pro-life counselling programs. However, efforts to statutorily
repeal Roe by either defining life at conception or curtailing federal court
jurisdiction in this area have been rejected. 158 Moreover, Congress has
refused to act on two proposed constitutional amendments: one a "paramount human life" amendment that would outlaw abortion by extending
constitutional protection to fetuses at the "moment of fertilization"; the
other a "human life federalism" amendment which provided that "[t]he
Congress and the several States shall have the concurrent power to
restrict and prohibit abortions; Provided, That a law of a State more
restrictive than a law of Congress shall govem." 159
Congress' reliance on appropriations-based policymaking in this
area is hardly surprising. Appropriations measures are preferred over
constitutional amendment and direct statutory repeals because they are
easier to enact. A funding ban, moreover, leaves the right intact and
hence appears a "moderate" response. As more than 200 members
argued in a brief defending the funding ban, Congress' decision not to
finance an activity that many find morally reprehensible does not necessarily call into question the correctness of Roe; instead, the decision not
153. See Albert M. Pearson & Paul M. Kurtz, The Abonion Controversy: A Study in Law and
Politics, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 427, 433-43 (1985).
154. For a summary analysis of these decisions, see TRlBE, supra note 137, at 10-26.
155. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 212-32.
156. /d. at 212.
157. /d.
158. /d.
159. S.J. Res. 8, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 129 CONG. REc. S514 (daily ed. Jan.
26, 1983); S.J. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 127 CONG. REC. 21,383 (1981).
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to appropriate is part of "the inviolatable and exclusive power of the
purse." 160 In Harris v. McRae, 161 the Supreme Court approved these
arguments and upheld the funding ban.
Congress, of course, is not the only elected branch interested in Roe.
The executive branch, especially during the Reagan and Bush presidencies, has been extremely active in its efforts to restrict abortion. For
example, Ronald Reagan, who claimed that "more than 15 million
unborn children have had their lives snuffed out by legalized abortions,"162 used the full arsenal of weapons available to a president: judicial and administrative appointments, court briefs, legislative proposals,
constitutional amendment proposals, and regulatory initiatives. The
principal weapon in this attack against Roe was regulation; the most significant regulatory initiatives were prohibitions on fetal tissue research163
and the so-called "gag order" prohibiting recipients of Title X funding
from mentioning abortion as a method of family planning. 164 The
Supreme Court upheld Title X family planning regulations in its May
1991 Rust v. Sullivan decision. 165
White House and congressional responses to Roe reveal the
extraordinary range of options available to elected government in the
face of a Supreme Court decision with which it disagrees. In the end,
however, the fulcrum of elected branch activity has been at the margins
and not at the heart of the Roe right. Direct repeal efforts have been
rejected in favor of funding bans and regulations that prohibit the government from engaging in activities that directly or indirectly support the
Roe right. By erecting a wall between the federal government and the
Roe right, the elected branches have expressed their disapproval of Roe
without engaging in direct battle with the judiciary. That Harris v.
McRae and Rust v. Sullivan both upheld these elected branch responses
reinforces the propriety of constitutional dialogues between the courts
and elected government. Moreover, by upholding such elected branch
responses to its decisions, the Court effectively reduces the pressure on
elected government to respond to a Supreme Court ruling through the
more drastic techniques of constitutional amendment or court stripping.
160. Brief of Rep. Jim Wright [and other Members of Congress] at 6, 14-15, 29, Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268), reprinted in FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 228.
161. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding a funding restriction that barred the use of Medicaid funds
even for medically necessary abortions).
162. RONALD REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 15, 19-21 (1984),
reprinted in FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 229.
163. See Michael Specter, NIH Told to Stop Use of Aborted Fetuses, WASH. PoST, Apr. 15,
1988, at Al. The ban was instituted in 1988 by the Reagan administration and is supported by the
Bush administration.
164. 42 C.F.R. §59 (1991). For further discussion, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at
221-23.
165. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). For further discussion, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at
223-25.
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This ongoing tug and pull between elected government and the
courts reveals that all parts of government work together (if not in tandem) in shaping constitutional values. On one hand, from 1973 to 1989,
the Supreme Court's consistent reaffirmation of Roe in the face of direct
state legislative challenges helped ensure the availability of affordable
abortion providers. On the other hand, by approving indirect federal
challenges in Harris and Rust, the Court recognized that elected government plays an important and appropriate role in the abortion arena.
Rosenberg's suggestion that Roe does not provide evidence of extrajudicial influence because political leaders did not rally behind the decision (pp. 234-35) is troublesome. That reform efforts sought to limit Roe
speaks to the potency of Court action in this area. State repeal efforts
could not withstand market mechanisms created by the Court. Congress
favored indirect attacks over direct repeal in order to avoid a direct challenge to Supreme Court authority. Of course, as Rosenberg recognizes,
nonjudicial influences play a critical role in shaping the abortion issue,
but he is wrong to speak of "the lack of judicial and extra-judicial effects
of Court decisions" (p. 265).
Webster: The Changing Face of Abortion Politics
The Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services reveals the impossibility of seeking to isolate and measure
the impact of court decisions. In approving fetal viability tests during
the second trimester of pregnancy and thereby finding "the rigid Roe
framework" unworkable, 166 Webster signaled a new era in abortion politics. But Webster's signals are mixed and not readily subject to measurement. While a powerful argument can be made that Webster's impact
has been de minimis, Rosenberg's criteria can be readily manipulated to
suggest otherwise. Considering the several instances where The Hollow
Hope underestimated the judicial role, this finding is surprising indeed.
By such measures as news and magazine coverage, political activity,
and increases in the membership and income of special interests, Webster
appears a tremendous victory for the right-to-life movement. Magazine
and news stories on abortion tripled from 1988 to 1989 (the year Webster
was decided). 167 Webster also bolstered anti-abortion political activity.
In the year following the decision, more than 350 anti-abortion bills were
3.

166. 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) {plurality opinion) (upholding a Missouri statute prohibiting
abortions in public facilities).
167. In a high-tech approximation of Rosenberg's method of counting entries in the Reader's
Guide to Periodic Literature, I conducted a search on the NEXIS library of the LEXIS database. I
searched the "Magazine" and "Major Papers" files, using the following search term:
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introduced in 43 state legislatures. 168 This flurry of activity was not a
short-lived phenomenon; during the first two months of the 1991legislative year, 135 more anti-abortion bills were introduced. 169 Most significant, Pennsylvania, Utah, Guam, and Louisiana all enacted stringent
anti-abortion measures. 170 Webster lay at the heart of these efforts; for
example, Utah Governor Norman Bangester, in supporting a tough antiabortion statute, commented that "[i]t's time to get this legislation before
the courts so we can receive some definitive information as to what the
state can do to more fully protect the sanctity and dignity of life." 171
Finally, "pro-life" groups experienced growth in contributions and membership in the wake of Webster. 172 By Rosenberg's measures, Webster's
"extra-judicial" impact appears quite significant.
Webster, no doubt, has advanced "pro-life" goals. By suggesting
that state laws previously invalidated would now withstand constitutional muster, Webster empowered states to place greater restrictions
on the abortion decision. But that empowerment is court-driven. With
respect to changes in politics and attitudes, Webster's principal beneficiaries are "pro-choice" interests. For example, the National Abortion
Rights Action League increased its paid membership by fifty percent
during the first six months of 1989, and saw its income surge from
$3.3 million a year to $1 million a month. 173 Likewise, the National
Organization for Women had its membership jump from 135,000 in 1988
to 252,000 in 1990. 174
Webster's ultimate impact on anti-abortion legislative reform efforts
is also subject to question. Hundreds of anti-abortion measures were
introduced after Webster, but. in the two years following the decision,
Headline (Abortion) and date = X
Date
# magazine stories
# stories, maj. papers
22
1986
300
1987
26
310
1988
611
47
2362
153
1989
1990
1849
98
1991
63
1821
168. Roberto Suro, Backers Push Louisiana Abortion Bill Toward Supreme Court Test, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1990, at A23.
169. State Reproductive Health Monitor: Legislative Proposals and Actions, ALAN
GUTIMACHER INsr., Feb. 1991, at i.
170. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 237-41. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791 (1992), the Supreme Court upheld most but not all of the provisions of the Pennsylvania
law. Because the laws in Utah, Guam, and Louisiana are stricter than the Pennsylvania law, it
seems likely that those statutes will be struck down. See David G. Savage, High Court Affirms Right
to Abortion, but Allows Some Restrictions by States, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at AI.
171. Maralee Schwartz, Utah Enacts Abortion Limits, Prepares for Bitter Court Test, WASH.
Posr, Jan. 26, 1991, at A2.
172. See Anne Kornhauser, Abortion Case Has Been Boon to Both Sides, LEGAL TIMES, July 3,
1989, at 1.
173. Carol Matlack, Mobilizing for the Abortion War, 28 NAT'L J. 1814, 1814-15 (1989).
174. NOW Factsheet (on file with author).
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only four of these measures took effect. 175 Moreover, only states with a
long history of enacting legislation challenging Roe gave serious consideration to new anti-abortion measures. 176 Knowing that "pro-choice"
forces were "going to take names and kick ankles," 177 many legislators
decided that the political costs of supporting anti-abortion legislation
were too great. Instead, as the Alan Guttmacher Institute concluded,
"lawmakers stayed in the 'safe,' familiar, middle ground." 178
If anything, lawmakers switched allegiance from "pro-life" to "prochoice" positions. In the two years following the decision, three statesConnecticut, Nevada, and Maryland-enacted legislation designed to
protect a woman's right to an abortion even if federal constitutional
guarantees failed. 179 Twenty-three members of Congress who previously supported abortion funding bans switched their votes. 180 The
Republican party also moderated its anti-abortion position. First, the
newly formed "Republicans for Choice" urged the dropping of a party
plank opposing abortion. Thereafter, then party Chairman Lee Atwater
described the GOP as a "big tent," open to all views on abortion. 181 At
the 1992 Republican convention, this "big tent" kept the anti-abortion
party plank, but allowed pro-choice speakers to play a prominent role at
the party's convention. 182 Finally, abortion proved decisive in 1989
gubernatorial races in Virginia and New Jersey where pro-choice candidates Douglas Wilder' and James Florio defeated anti-abortion candidates Marshall Coleman and James Courter. 183 Moreover, a 1990
Congressional Quarterly study found abortion to be "the most critical
non-money issue" in 1990 gubernatorial races. 184
Webster, then, clearly changed the political landscape of abortion
politics without prompting significant changes in abortion rights. Rather
than suggesting that court opinions are of little consequence, however,
this state of affairs bespeaks the importance of judicial action. By chang175. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 237.
176. See Halva-Neubauer, supra note 152.
177. 135 CoNG. REc. H4928 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. AuCoin).
178. State Reproductive Health Monitor: Legislative Proposals and Actions, ALAN
GUTIMACHER INST., Dec. 1990, at i.
179. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 241-42.
180. See Beth Donovan, Abortion's Changing Politics Keys House Turnaround, 47 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 2020, 2022 (Aug. 5, 1989).
181. Ronald Brownstein, Losing While Winning: The Abortion Albatross, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5,
1990, at M4; see also Beth Donovan, New GOP Group Seeks to Erase Ban in Party Platform, 48
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1383 (May 5, 1990).
182. See GOP Convention: Pro-Choicer to Speak, Caravan "Stalled," AM. POL. NETWORK
ABORTION REP., Aug. 3, 1992; Abortion Right Leaders Concede Defeat, NAT'L JOURNAL's
CONGRESS DAILY, Aug. 17, 1992.
183. David Whitman et al., The Abortion Hype, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 2, 1990, at
20.
184. Holly ldelson, Budgets, Jobs and Abortion Are Big Issues in States, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 2840, 2840 (Sept. 8, 1990).
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ing the calculus of anti-abortion proposals, Webster made right-to-life
initiatives less likely to succeed. Instead, the Roe-created "status quo"
has become the governing norm-despite the fact that Roe had earlier
invalidated 46 state laws. In fact, the Supreme Court's 1992 reaffirmation of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 185 was explicitly grounded in
the stare decisis effect of Roe. 186 While Planned Parenthood also reaffirmed Webster's repudiation of the "rigid" trimester test, 187 its adherence to Roe's "central holding" 188 further reveals the transformative
power of judicial edicts. That this transformation of the status quo
involves not just judicial action but also market conditions, elected government, and interest groups, is beyond dispute. The judiciary, however,
is certainly a partner in this dynamic process.

III
CONCLUSION: REEXPLAINING THE HOLLOW HOPE

That there are instances where court opinions seem inconsequential
cannot be denied. Supreme Court decisions limiting religious observance
in the public schools and prohibiting the legislative veto, for example, are
often disregarded. The public school cases demand that objecting students bear the fiscal and emotional toll of challenging school systems that
would prefer to heed religious belief ahead of Supreme Court decisions.
This price is quite high and consequently many religious practices remain
unchallenged. 189 The legislative veto is a more dramatic, more surprising
case, for the affected parties are Congress and the White House, rather
than ''backwater" school systems. Nonetheless, following the Supreme
Court's 1983 repudiation of this device in INS v. Chadha, 190 more than
200 new legislative vetoes have been enacted and countless informal
arrangements have been made between oversight committees and government agencies. 191 The explanation for this widespread disobedience is
that neither Congress nor the White House "wants the static model of
separated powers offered by the Court. The inevitable result is a record
185. 112 s. Ct. 2791 (1992).
186. /d. at 2808-09.
187. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Packing the Court Is Harder than It Appears, AM. LAW., Aug.
7, 1992, at 9.
188. Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
189. See, e.g., KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER
DECISIONS (1971); PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS (1988); Robert H.
Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the "Schempp" Decision, 10
MIDWEST 1. POL. Sc1. 304 (1966); Choper, supra note 145, at 8-9; Frank 1. Sorauf, Zorach v.
Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 777, 784-91 (1959). At
the same time, school prayer and bible reading decisions were consequential, for many systems did
alter their practices to comply with these Court rulings. See, e.g., WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER
IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967) (examining how Supreme Court decisions affected school officials in
one school district).
190. 462 u.s. 919 (1983).
191. See generally FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 121-42.
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of noncompliance, subtle evasion, and a system of lawmaking that is now
more convoluted, cumbersome, and covert than before." 192 That the
Court repudiated the legislative veto hardly matters. With both sides
benefitting from legislative veto arrangements, 193 market forces have simply driven them underground.
The legislative veto and religion cases share a common feature.
Neither decision creates incentives for compliance. Compliance, instead,
is a by-product of the implementing community. Consequently, when
the implementing community resists, the judicial impact is muted. In
other instances, however, elected government acts affirmatively in the
face of a decision that is not self-implementing. The demand that taxexempt organizations comply with nondiscrimination regulations and
that broadcast licensing decisions take race into account are both the
direct result of court action. 194 More significantly, federal desegregation
efforts prompted southern school desegregation in the wake of widespread resistance to Brown. 195
Judicial influences are more pronounced when incentives for
enforcement are a natural outgrowth of the opinion. Employers now
incorporate Title VII rulings into their hiring and promotion practices in
order to avoid litigation costs. 196 Likewise, health care providers
responded to the extraordinary demand for nonhospital abortions in the
wake of Roe by opening abortion clinics. 197 Elected government may
strengthen these self-implementing decisions. For example, employment
discrimination litigation pursued by the EEOC and Department of
Justice quickened the pace of Title VII compliance. Elected government
may also oppose self-implementing decisions, as occurred when antiabortion funding restrictions prevented some poor women from seeking
an abortion. Yet, unlike non-self-implementing decisions, where government resistance is extremely significant, self-implementing decisions can
withstand governmental attack. Witness the abortion decision: despite
the approval of the abortion funding ban in Ha"is v. McRae, abortion
rates have remained stable. 198
192. FISHER, supra note 10, at 228.
193. See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV.
207 (1984).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 71-90.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 37-54.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
198. See Kim Painter, '87 Abortion Rate Shows Decline from '80, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 25, 1991,
at A3. The article cites a Guttmacher Institute Report that finds that while 29 out of every 1000
women had abortions in 1980, 27 out of every 1000 women had abortions in 1987. Because the
number of women of childbearing age has increased, however, the overall number of abortions has
been steady at 1.6 million per annum. Significantly, the study indicates that the abortion rate of
women under 15 years old and of minorities between 15 and 19 years actually increased. In fact, the
decrease can be attributed solely to a decrease in abortions for white women over 19 years oldthose least likely to have been affected by the Ha"is decision.
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Courts matter. They matter a lot. Sometimes their orders set in
motion market mechanisms which guarantee their effectiveness. 199
Sometimes the threat of judicial action prompts either settlement or legislative initiative.200 Their opinions influence legislative deliberations201
and change the status quo. 202 Occasionally, they trump agencies and
interpose their normative views into the law. It may be that these influences sometimes result in unwise policy decisions and sometimes exceed
the proper judicial role in our system of separated powers, but they are
judicial influences nonetheless.
The Hollow Hope unduly discounts these judicial contributions.
Courts are given inadequate credit for what they do, as well as too much
blame for what they do not do. 203 While Rosenberg does a masterful job
of showing that courts do not effect change alone, he goes too far in
refusing to recognize that the judiciary is actively involved in a partnership with elected government. His repeated broadsides at the judiciary
sound a message of judicial irrelevance rather than one of limited governmental partnership. 204
In some respects, Rosenberg's problem is one of articulation, not
analysis. Instances where court opinions are made meaningful through
market mechanisms or elected branch participation are recognized (pp.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48 (judicial authorization of non-hospital
abortions created market for their supply); see also supra text accompanying notes 114-16 (judicial
enforcement of Title VII encouraged employers to change their hiring practices to avoid litigation).
200. Settlement agreements are extraordinarily important, for government agencies are
sometimes willing to establish long term policy priorities through judicially entered consent decrees.
See generally Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree, 40
STAN. L. REv. 203 (1987) (describing such decrees and arguing that a president's policymaking
discretion cannot be bargained away through them).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49 (describing Brown's influence on civil rights
legislation such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act).
202. See supra Section II.B.3.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 30-54 (Rosenberg understates the political and social
importance of Brown and ignores the controversial post-Green period); text accompanying notes
121-36 (Rosenberg's analysis of women's rights, in which courts played a relatively minor role, does
not support the conclusion that courts are incapable of bringing about social change). The Hollow
Hope also does not consider the Court's influence in furthering elected branch initiatives by
upholding such conduct. For example, Jonathan Casper argues that post-1937 decisions upholding
New Deal initiatives reveal the Court's role in "leading other groups and interests in society to come
to grips with laissez-faire economic policy and the interests that supported it." Jonathan D. Casper,
The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 50, 62 (1976). Likewise,
Charles Black has argued that the principal function of the Supreme Court is to legitimate elected
branch initiatives by subjeeting them to countermajoritarian judicial review. See CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, 37-53 (1960).
204. Robert Dahl explained some thirty-five years ago why the Supreme Court is not "simply an
agent of the alliance." Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. LAw 279, 293 (1957). For Dahl, although the Court
cannot frustrate "the basic policy goals of the dominant alliance, the Court can make national
policy. Its discretion, then, is not unlike that of a powerful committee chairman in Congress who ...
can, within ... limits, often determine important questions of timing, effectiveness, and subordinate
policy." /d. at 293-94.
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30-36). But rather than acknowledge the judicial contribution here,
these evidences of partnership are caricatured as "constraints" and "conditions" demonstrative of a de minimis judicial role. In other words, by
seeking to isolate and measure the judiciary's contribution, these partnership influences are deemed evidence of impotence. 205
Rosenberg's shortcomings can also be attributed to the ambitiousness of The Hollow Hope. Perceiving that existing scholarship on judicial
influences is unsatisfying because "findings remain unconnected and not
squarely centered on whether, and under what conditions, courts produce significant social reform" (p. 9), Rosenberg seeks to go boldly where
no one has gone before. His problem-as others before him have recognized-is that "the repercussions of all government actions ramify indefinitely and interrelate with other phenomena, both public and private,
many of which simply cannot be quantified and indeed often cannot even
be identified. " 206 Supreme Court decisions "are part of a general milieu
in which later events take place and part of a set of multiple causes of
such events."207
Problems with The Hollow Hope do not mean that Rosenberg's concerns are without merit. Nonjudicial forces, whether political or social,
are infrequently studied and grossly underestimated. Combined with
inherent limits on the judiciary's power to manage reform, these nonjudicial forces suggest that social reform through litigation is a gamble. But
these "constraints" speak to caution, not to the abandonment of courtinitiated reform.
Ironically, what makes Rosenberg's recommendation of political
reform especially appealing is that Rehnquist Court's rulings increasingly
speak of the need to defer to elected government, and not because elected
government disregards activist decision-making. Federal agency interpretations of vague statutory language are likely to be upheld because
"substantial deference is accorded to the interpretation of the authorizing
statute by the agency authorized with administering it." 208 State action
too is subject to less stringent inquiry, for the Court now appears unwill205. Although I have not attempted such a measurement, there is good reason to think that the
legislative initiatives Rosenberg cites as important events would not measure well in isolation. As
this Review Essay has shown, these initiatives are best understood as by·products of mutually
dependent conduct.
206. Choper, supra note 145, at 7. Bob Katzmann likewise argues that policymaking is best
thought of as "dynamic and complex, as 'a continuum of institutional processes [judicial, legislative,
and administrative], sometimes acting independently, but often interacting in subtle and perhaps not
always conscious ways ... .' " Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL CoMITY 7, 12 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (quoting
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY 9).
207. STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT 32 (1970).
208. Rust v. Sullivan, IllS. Ct 1759, 1767 (1991} (emphasis added}. In upholding the Reagan
gag order in Rust, the Court found it inconsequential that the Reagan regulation departed from
Nixon, Ford, and Carter administration standards, noting that "(t]he court need not conclude that
the agency construction [is the one] ... the court would have reached if the question initially had
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ing to strike down "a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law" irrespective of its effects on individual rights. 209
Special interests have begun to alter their strategies in response to
these rulings. The National Abortion Rights Action League recently
informed its membership that "[c]learly Congress is our Court of Last
Resort. All hope of protecting our constitutional right to choose depends
upon our elected representatives in Congress responding to the will of the
American people."210 Other groups have also proclaimed Congress "our
court of last resort" and concluded that the battle over the judiciary is
now lost. 211 Although there undoubtedly will be occasions where these
groups turn to the federal courts/ 12 reform efforts in civil rights, the
environment, privacy, and a host of other concerns will now target Congress, the executive, and the states.
Rosenberg's sobering account of the limits of judicial intervention
will bolster this trend. To the extent that people expect too much from
the courts, The Hollow Hope's pessimism is necessary, if not welcome.
Rosenberg, however, goes too far. The Hollow Hope emphasizes the
Court's dependence but hardly recoguizes its influence. Rosenberg's
conclusion that social change can rarely be advanced through court
action is absolute, and therefore flawed. For Rosenberg, it does not matter whether the Court in power is the Warren Court of the 1960s or the
Rehnquist Court of the 1990s-inherent limitations on the judicial power
will control.
The Hollow Hope cannot substantiate this claim. Through a combination of incomplete analysis, questionable presumptions, and indirection, The Hollow Hope underestimates the sweep of the judiciary's
contribution to social reform. The judiciary may now appear dormant,
but it should not be written off.

arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. (quoting Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.ll (1984)).
209. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990)
(discussing religious rights); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S.Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991)
("generally applicable laws" do not infringe on free speech rights of the press). Further evidence
that the raison d'itre of the Rehnquist Court is validating governmental conduct is the Court's
refusal to support challenges by "business" against government regulation. See Stephen Wermiel,
Decisions on Workplace Damages Provide Little to Hearten Business, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1991 at
AS.
210. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 7.
211. See, e.g., Rev. Amos Brown, Remarks Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the
Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court (Sept. 20, 1991) (transcript available on
Westlaw) ("We cannot lift [Clarence Thomas] up as a symbol on a court that is already stacked, thus
rendering his one presence ineffective.").
212. If nothing else, court filings draw attention to an issue. For example, pro·choice forces
made front page news recently when they demanded that the Supreme Court either reaffirm or
abandon Roe. See Richard L. Berke, Groups Backing Abortion Rights Ask Court to Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1991, at AI.
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